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First Amendment Limits on Library Collection Management*
Anne Klinefelter**
First Amendment freedoms impose some limits on publicly funded libraries’ discre-
tion to manage their collections, but identifying those limits is difficult. The First 
Amendment law of libraries is murky territory, defined by three Supreme Court 
decisions that failed to produce majority opinions and lower court opinions that have 
employed a variety of doctrinal approaches. Libraries nonetheless must make sense 
of these cases to create and implement collection development and Internet access 
policies and procedures. This article surveys and analyzes the First Amendment law 
of library collections and finds that libraries’ discretion is broad, but certain limita-
tions apply. These can serve as a reminder to librarians of their ethical commitment 
to challenge censorship and provide access to all points of view. 
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Introduction
¶1	May	a	state	law	library	adopt	a	policy	to	collect	books	written	by	Democrats	
but	 not	 Republicans?	May	 a	 county	 law	 library	 decline	 to	 add	 to	 its	 collection	
donations	of	 books	 arguing	 against	 voting	 rights	 for	women?	May	 a	 law	 school	
library	refuse	to	disable	Internet	filters	that	block	sites	on	breast	cancer?	May	a	law	
school	library	remove	books	because	students	complain	that	the	books	are	racist?
¶2	The	short	answers	are:	almost	certainly	not,	probably,	maybe	not,	and	prob-
ably	not.	The	general	 answer	 is	 that	 law	 libraries,	 including	publicly	 funded	 law	
libraries,	have	broad	discretion	to	manage	their	collections,	including	controlling	
Internet	access.	If	decisions	are	reasonable	in	light	of	the	library’s	mission	and	not	
an	attempt	to	prevent	access	to	an	idea,	libraries	should	be	safely	within	the	bound-
aries	of	the	First	Amendment.	
¶3	Truth	be	 told,	 law	 librarians	do	not	much	discuss	 the	 implications	of	 the	
First	Amendment	in	law	libraries.	One	reason	for	this	omission	is	that	few	conflicts	
in	law	libraries	lead	to	litigation.	Librarians	in	private	law	libraries	are	not	subject	
to	First	Amendment	restrictions,	and	publicly	funded	law	libraries	rarely	confront	
patron	challenges	or	legislative	restraints	beyond	requirements	that	collections	be	
related	to	the	law.	Another	reason	that	law	librarians	do	not	much	discuss	library	
First	Amendment	cases	could	be	because	these	cases	form	a	messy,	largely	incoher-
ent	body	of	 law,	 including	three	Supreme	Court	decisions	that	 failed	to	produce	
majority	opinions.	This	case	law	is	confusing	and	difficult	for	librarians	to	use	as	
guidance	in	collection	management.
¶4	But	those	of	us	in	publicly	funded	law	libraries	could	take	some	tips	from	
our	colleagues	in	public	and	school	libraries,	where	First	Amendment	challenges	
are	more	common.	Law	libraries	may	have	similar	problems	managing	access	 to	
illegal	and	controversial	materials	on	the	Internet.	Academic	law	libraries	in	par-
ticular	could	be	targets	for	conservative	or	liberal	groups	who	might	demand	addi-
tion	 or	 removal	 of	materials	 from	 library	 collections.1	And	 all	 law	 libraries	 are	
	 1.	 The	 organization	 called	 Students	 for	 Academic	 Freedom	 has	 promoted	 a	 greater	 repre-
sentation	 of	 conservative	 viewpoints	 in	 higher	 education	 and	might	 target	 campus	 libraries.	 See	
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subject	to	potential	questions	from	a	supervising	authority	about	the	inclusion	or	
exclusion	of	particular	viewpoints	in	the	library’s	collection.	Law	librarians	should	
understand	the	application	of	the	First	Amendment	to	help	them	make	collection	
decisions	and	respond	appropriately	to	the	recommendations	of	library	users	and	
institutional	supervisors.	
¶5	This	article	explains	why	library	cases	are	so	difficult	for	courts	and	identifies	
the	fuzzy	boundaries	of	libraries’	discretion	in	collection	management	that	emerge	
from	library	cases.	First	Amendment	boundaries	of	 libraries’	discretion	are	 fairly	
remote	and	unlikely	to	interfere	with	most	 law	libraries’	collection	decisions.	But	
they	 probably	 prevent	 all	 publicly	 funded	 libraries	 from	 removing	 and	 perhaps	
excluding	materials	as	an	attempt	solely	to	suppress	access	to	the	view	expressed.	
And	these	First	Amendment	restrictions	suggest	that	publicly	funded	law	libraries	
should	 follow	 adequate	procedures	 before	 enforcing	policies	 that	 could	 interfere	
with	library	patrons’	access	to	library	resources.
¶6	A	number	of	legal	scholars	and	libraries	themselves	have	argued	that	a	solu-
tion	to	the	messy	and	confusing	First	Amendment	law	of	libraries	is	to	give	libraries	
absolute	or	nearly	absolute	discretion	to	manage	their	collections.2	Law	librarians	
Barbara	Bintliff	and	Dick	Danner	have	suggested	that	academic	librarians’	collec-
tion	management	could	be	protected	from	both	institutional	and	external	influence	
through	academic	freedom	principles.3	This	article	adds	to	the	discussion	by	sur-
veying	Supreme	Court	and	relevant	 lower	court	opinions	 to	 identify	 the	existing	
boundaries	of	libraries’	discretion	under	the	First	Amendment.	This	examination	
of	 library	First	Amendment	cases	has	 four	goals:	 (1)	 to	explain	why	 library	First	
Amendment	 law	 is	 complex	 and	 confusing;	 (2)	 to	 provide	 a	 current	 survey	 of	
Supreme	Court	and	lower	court	cases;	(3)	to	show	that	the	First	Amendment	limits	
library	collection	development	in	situations	that	are,	 fortunately,	unusual	 for	 law	
libraries;	and	finally,	(4)	to	suggest	how	law	libraries	can	protect	themselves	from	
potential	challenges	and	use	their	broad	discretion	in	support	of	institutional,	ethi-
cal,	and	First	Amendment	goals.
The First Amendment and Library Collection  
Management—A Surprising Mismatch
Congress	shall	make	no	law	respecting	an	establishment	of	religion,	or	prohibiting	
the	free	exercise	thereof;	or	abridging	the	freedom	of	speech,	or	of	the	press;	or	the	
Students	 for	Academic	Freedom,	Academic	Bill	of	Rights,	http://www.studentsforacademicfreedom
.org/documents/1925/abor.html	(last	visited	May	3,	2010).	The	American	Library	Association	passed	
a	 resolution	 denouncing	 this	 organization’s	 efforts	 as	 counter	 to	 academic	 freedom.	 Am.	 Library	
Ass’n,	Resolution	in	Support	of	Academic	Freedom	(adopted	Jan.	25,	2006),	http://www.ala.org/ala/
aboutala/offices/oif/statementspols/ifresolutions/academicfreedom.cfm.	Liberal	trends	to	restrict	hate	
speech	have	secured	campus	policies	for	public	discourse	at	a	number	of	universities	that	could	target	
university	 and	academic	 law	 libraries.	Robert	V.	Labaree,	The Regulation of Hate Speech on College 
Campuses and the Library Bill of Rights,	19	J. AcAd. LibrAriAnship 372	(1994).
	 2.	 See infra	¶¶	20–22.
	 3.	 Barbara	 Bintliff	 &	 Richard	 A.	 Danner,	 Academic Freedom Issues for Academic Librarians,	
LegAL reference services Q.,	2006,	No.	4,	at	13,	20.	For	more	on	the	academic	freedom	aspect	of	the	
First	Amendment	question,	see	infra ¶	22.	
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right	of	the	people	peaceably	to	assemble,	and	to	petition	the	government	for	a	
redress	of	grievances.4	
features of first Amendment Law Relating to Libraries
¶7	Library	First	Amendment	law	is	a	function	both	of	constitutional	doctrine	
and	of	the	practice	of	library	management.	The	following	summaries	of	the	special	
characteristics	 of	 the	 law	 and	 of	 library	 collection	 management	 show	 how	 the	
intersection	between	the	two	has	aspects	of	a	collision	of	interests	rather	than	an	
artful	 intertwining	 of	 similar	 missions.	 These	 sections	 explain	 why	 the	 First	
Amendment	law	of	libraries	is	so	messy	and	provide	context	for	the	case	analysis	
that	follows.	
Conflict Between Collection Selectivity and Neutral Treatment of Speech 
¶8	 Law	 librarians	 in	 publicly	 funded	 libraries	 may	 think	 of	 their	 collection	
management	 and	 other	 services	 as	 supporting	 First	 Amendment	 freedoms	 of	
speech	and	the	press	because	these	libraries	increase	access	to	information,	largely	
without	direct	cost	to	the	library	user.	Indeed,	library	associations	promote	ethical	
principles	 that	 encourage	 broad	 access	 to	 a	 diversity	 of	 ideas.	 The	 American	
Association	 of	 Law	 Libraries	 (AALL)	 endorses	 the	 Library	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 of	 the	
American	Library	Association,	which	asserts	that	libraries	should	“challenge	cen-
sorship”	and	present	“all	points	of	view”	in	library	collections.5	This	policy	states	
that	 “library	 resources	 should	 be	 provided	 for	 the	 interest,	 information,	 and	
enlightenment	of	all	people	of	the	community	.	.	.	.”6	The	AALL	Ethical	Principles	
lead	with	the	declaration	that	law	libraries	make	it	possible	for	individuals	to	par-
ticipate	 fully	 in	 the	 democratic	 process.7	 These	 statements	 show	 that	 librarians,	
including	 law	 librarians,	have	as	 their	professional	goals	many	of	 the	commonly	
attributed	goals	of	the	First	Amendment—truth	that	emerges	from	the	“market-
place	of	ideas,”8	individual	expression	and	development,9	and	democracy.10
¶9	But	libraries’	selectivity	in	collection	management	runs	afoul	of	the	standard	
tests	for	compliance	with	the	First	Amendment.	Courts	generally	require	govern-
ment	actors	to	treat	speech	in	neutral	ways	to	avoid	abridging	freedom	of	speech	
and	of	the	press.	One	way	courts	measure	First	Amendment	neutrality	is	through	
	 4.	 U.s. const.	amend.	I.
	 5.	 Am. LibrAry Ass’n coUnciL, LibrAry biLL of rights (1996),	 available at	 http://www.ala
.org/ala/aboutala/offices/oif/statementspols/statementsif/librarybillofrights.pdf;	 Am.	 Ass’n	 of	 Law	
Libraries,	Government	Relations	Policy	§	V	(Apr.	2008), available at	http://www.aallnet.org/about/
policy_government.asp.
	 6.	 Am. LibrAry Ass’n coUnciL, supra note	5.
	 7.	 See Am.	Ass’n	 of	 Law	Libraries,	 Ethical	 Principles	 (Apr.	 5,	 1999),	available at	 http://www
.aallnet.org/about/policy_ethics.asp.	
	 8.	 William	P.	Marshall,	In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification,	30	
gA. L. rev.	1,	1	(1995).	See also Citizens	United	v.	FCC,	130	S.	Ct.	876,	884	(2010);	John stUArt miLL, 
on Liberty	15–52	(Elizabeth	Rapaport	ed.,	Hackett	Pub.	Co.	1978)	(1859).
	 9.	 See, e.g.,	Rosenberger	v.	Rector	&	Visitors	of	Univ.	of	Va.,	515	U.S.	819,	835	(1995);	C.	Edwin	
Baker,	 Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,	 25	UcLA L. rev.	 964	 (1978);	Martin	H.	
Redish,	The Value of Free Speech,	130	U. pA. L. rev.	591	(1982).
	 10.	 See, e.g.,	Citizens United,	130	S.	Ct.	at	898;	Alexander	Meiklejohn,	The	First Amendment Is an 
Absolute,	1961	sUp. ct. rev.	245,	263.
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skeptical	review	of	government	decisions	that	make	distinctions	based	on	the	con-
tent	of	private	speech.11	But	publicly	funded	libraries	regularly	select	material	for	
their	collections	based	on	the	content	of	those	materials.	For	example,	a	county	law	
library	in	California	might	buy	a	guide	to	the	law	of	oceanfront	development,	while	
a	county	law	library	in	Iowa	might	not.	
¶10	Courts	are	even	more	skeptical	when	government	makes	decisions	based	on	
the	viewpoint	expressed	 in	private	 speech.12	Public	 libraries	arguably	make	 these	
types	of	distinctions	as	well	when	they	select	materials	based	on	quality	and	on	the	
likely	level	of	interest	to	the	communities	they	serve.	For	example,	a	state	supreme	
court	law	library	might	not	add	donations	of	books	arguing	against	voting	rights	
for	women	if	the	library	found	the	views	expressed	were	not	related	to	the	library’s	
mission	 to	manage	 limited	 resources	 through	access	 to	 current	primary	 law	and	
practice	guides.	
¶11	As	 a	philosophical	matter,	publicly	 funded	 libraries’	 selective	 support	 for	
speech	and	the	press	actually	distorts	 the	marketplace	of	 ideas,	providing	greater	
access	for	some	ideas	over	others.	Selective	support	for	information	might	also	fail	
to	support	some	individuals’	reading	interests	and	frustrate	the	First	Amendment	
goal	 of	 individual	 expression	 and	 development.	 Further,	 if	 libraries’	 selection	
choices	are	seen	as	representing	the	government’s	view	of	what	is	the	best	informa-
tion,	 libraries	 compromise	 two	 other	 goals	 commonly	 attributed	 to	 the	 First	
Amendment—citizen	 oversight	 of	 government13	 and	 the	 prevention	 of	 govern-
ment’s	ability	to	make	speech	distinctions.14	One	might	well	argue	that	selectivity	
in	 law	 library	collections,	particularly	 if	 it	applied	to	providing	access	 to	 the	 law,	
would	frustrate	the	First	Amendment	goal	of	democracy.	
¶12	Selectivity	in	library	collections,	though,	is	unavoidable	given	the	scarcity	of	
resources	 for	collections,	 staffing,	 facilities,	and	 technology.	Some	would	say	 that	
selectivity	is	not	only	a	function	of	necessity	due	to	scarce	resources	but	also	a	func-
tion	of	design.	Law	libraries	especially	have	a	purpose	or	mission	that	requires	them	
to	make	selections	based	on	the	content	of	materials.	A	number	of	public	library	
librarians,	 however,	 promote	 a	 shift	 from	 the	 public	 community	 library’s	 tradi-
tional	 purpose	 as	 moral	 and	 intellectual	 arbiter	 to	 a	 more	 neutral	 information	
manager.15	These	advocates	sometimes	seek	court	support	for	their	efforts	to	pro-
vide	access	to	controversial	materials	through	enforcement	of	the	First	Amendment.16	
	 11.	 See, e.g.,	Police	Dep’t	of	Chicago	v.	Mosley,	408	U.S.	92	 (1972)	 (applying	 strict	 scrutiny	 to	
content-based	regulations).
	 12.	 See, e.g.,	Cornelius	v.	NAACP	Legal	Def.	&	Educ.	Fund,	Inc.,	473	U.S.	788,	806,	812–13	(1985)	
(remanding	for	determination	of	whether	suppression	of	viewpoint	was	motivation	for	regulations).	
	 13.	 See, e.g.,	Rosenberger,	515	U.S.	at	835;	Vincent	Blasi,	The Checking Value in First Amendment 
Theory,	1977	A.b.A. foUnd. res. J.	521.	
	 14.	 See Ruth	Walden,	A Government Action Approach to First Amendment Analysis,	69	JoUrnALism 
Q.	65	(1992).
	 15.	 See, e.g.,	JAmes LArUe, the new inQUisition: UnderstAnding And mAnAging inteLLectUAL 
freedom chALLenges	 (2007);	 office for inteLLectUAL freedom of the Am. LibrAry Ass’n, 
inteLLectUAL freedom mAnUAL	 (7th	 ed.	 2006);	LoUise s. robbins, censorship And the AmericAn 
LibrAry: the AmericAn LibrAry AssociAtion’s response to threAts to inteLLectUAL freedom, 
1939–1969	(1996).
	 16.	 See United	States	v.	Am.	Library	Ass’n (ALA II),	539	U.S.	194	(2003)	(plurality	opinion);	John	
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As	advances	in	information	technology	have	diminished	the	impact	of	scarcity	of	
library	resources,	some	argue	that	courts	should	apply	stricter	standards	for	public	
libraries’	First	Amendment	compliance.17	But,	whether	based	on	scarcity	alone	or	
on	both	scarcity	and	design,	selectivity	continues	to	be	a	defining	characteristic	of	
all	publicly	funded	libraries,	including	law	libraries.	Given	this	selectivity,	and	given	
the	general	societal	consensus	that	libraries	are	an	overall	benefit,	courts	are	wary	
of	 applying	 standard	First	Amendment	analysis	 in	 library	cases	 for	 fear	 that	 the	
entire	library	system	could	be	found	in	violation	of	the	First	Amendment.18	
Other First Amendment Rights in Library Cases
¶13	In	addition	to	collection	management,	a	variety	of	other	First	Amendment	
rights	can	be	at	issue	in	library	cases,	and	all	of	these	may	affect	the	law	of	library	
collections.	Libraries	have	been	challenged	on	free	exercise	and	on	establishment	of	
religion	grounds	as	well	as	infringement	of	association	rights	for	restrictive	policies	
on	access	to	meeting	rooms.19	Libraries	have	been	defendants	in	freedom	of	speech	
and	press	challenges	to	the	removal20	or	relocation21	of	books,	the	filtering	of	the	
Internet,22	and	actions	or	policies	that	regulate	users’	behavior	and	thereby	access	
to	the	library	and	the	library’s	collection.23	Some	restrictions	on	user	behavior	have	
been	found	to	violate	the	right	of	assembly	and	the	right	to	petition	the	govern-
ment	for	redress	of	grievances.24	Libraries	have	challenged	legislation	on	behalf	of	
the	 library	 user’s	 right	 to	 receive	 information	 through	 the	 rights	 of	 freedom	of	
speech	and	of	the	press.25	As	libraries	increase	Internet	services,	patrons	may	chal-
lenge	any	policies	or	software	filters	that	restrict	library	Internet	use	as	interference	
N.	Gathegi, The Public Library as a Public Forum: The (De)Evolution of a Legal Doctrine,	75	Libr. Q.	1	
(2005).
	 17.	 The	mission	of	the	public	library	relating	to	Internet	access	was	at	the	core	of	the	controversy	
in	the	ALA cases.	For	an	examination	of	how	the	Supreme	Court	has	struggled	with	understanding	
the	role	of	libraries	in	society,	see	Raizel	Liebler,	Institutions of Learning or Havens for Illegal Activities: 
How the Supreme Court Views Libraries,	25	n. iLL. U. L. rev.	1	(2004).
	 18.	 Justice	Breyer	wrote,	“To	apply	‘strict	scrutiny’	to	the	‘selection’	of	a	library’s	collection	.	.	.	
would	unreasonably	interfere	with	the	discretion	necessary	to	create,	maintain,	or	select	a	 library’s	
‘collection’	.	.	.	.”	ALA II,	539	U.S.	at	217	(Breyer,	J.,	concurring	in	the	judgment).
	 19.	 Faith	Ctr.	Church	Evangelistic	Ministries	v.	Glover,	No.	C	04-03111	JSW,	2009	WL	1765974	
(N.D.	Cal.	June	19,	2009)	(upholding	library	meeting	room	policy	prohibiting	use	for	pure	religious	
worship	as	not	viewpoint	discrimination,	but	a	category	of	content	restriction	consistent	with	pur-
poses	of	the	library	as	limited	public	forum);	Ethnic	Employees	of	Library	of	Congress	v.	Boorstin,	
Nos.	 80-2163,	 82-2264,	 1987	WL	 4804	 (D.D.C.	 Jan.	 16,	 1987)	 (considering	 association	 rights	 of	
employees	under	policy	of	access	to	meeting	rooms	for	employee	organizations),	aff ’d,	865	F.2d	1329	
(Table)	(D.C.	Cir.	Jan.	25,	1989).	
	 20.	 Bd.	of	Educ.	v.	Pico	(Pico III),	457	U.S.	853	(1982)	(plurality	opinion).
	 21.	 Sund	v.	City	of	Wichita	Falls,	121	F.	Supp.	2d	530	(N.D.	Tex.	2000).
	 22.	 ALA II,	539	U.S.	194;	Miller	v.	Nw.	Region	Library	Bd.,	348	F.	Supp.	2d	563	(M.D.N.C.	2004);	
Mainstream	Loudoun	v.	Bd.	of	Trs.	(Loudoun I),	2	F.	Supp.	2d	783	(E.D.	Va.	1998);	Crosby	v.	S.	Orange	
County	Cmty.	Coll.	Dist.,	172	Cal.	App.	4th	433	(Cal.	Ct.	App.	2009).
	 23.	 See, e.g.,	Neinast	v.	Bd.	of	Trs.,	346	F.3d	585	(6th	Cir.	2003);	Kreimer	v.	Bureau	of	Police,	958	
F.2d	1242	(3d	Cir.	1992).	
	 24.	 Brown	v.	Louisiana,	383	U.S.	131	(1966)	(prevailing	three-Justice	opinion	holding	that	pun-
ishing	civil	rights	activists	for	a	silent	sit-in	at	a	public	library	violated	their	First	Amendment	rights).
	 25.	 Am.	Library	Ass’n	v.	United	States	(ALA I),	201	F.	Supp.	2d	401,	450–51	(E.D.	Pa.	2002),	rev’d,	
539	U.S.	194	(2003).
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with	a	right	to	quiet	expression	on	blogs	and	wikis	or	a	right	to	petition	the	govern-
ment	through	e-mail	to	officials.26	
Different First Amendment Law for Different Types of Libraries
¶14	A	reasonable	question	is	why	the	First	Amendment,	which	begins	“Congress	
shall	make	no	law,”	should	apply	to	publicly	funded	libraries	at	all,	particularly	law	
libraries.	Although	the	language	of	the	First	Amendment	restricts	only	Congress’s	
power	 to	make	 laws	 that	 interfere	 with	 certain	 rights,	 courts	 have	 extended	 the	
amendment’s	application	to	actions	of	all	branches	of	government	and,	through	the	
Fourteenth	Amendment,	to	the	states	and	their	subsidiaries.27	With	few	exceptions,	
libraries	that	are	largely	publicly	funded	and	open	to	the	public	are	recognized	by	
courts	 as	 government	 actors	 who	 must	 act	 within	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 First	
Amendment.28	Some	libraries	at	private	institutions	could	possibly	qualify	as	gov-
ernment	actors	if	the	court	found	that	government	is	responsible	for	the	challenged	
behavior,	but	this	finding	is	rare	and	is	unlikely	to	apply	to	law	firm	libraries,	cor-
porate	law	libraries,	or	other	private	libraries.29	
¶15	In	modern	analysis,	courts	further	divide	government	actors	into	types	of	
forums	 to	 determine	 their	 level	 of	 obligation	 under	 the	 First	 Amendment.	
Government	actors	are	categorized	as	traditional	public	forums,	designated	or	lim-
ited	public	forums,	and	nonpublic	forums.	Traditional	public	forums,	idealized	as	
a	public	park,	 are	 those	where	First	Amendment	 freedoms	are	most	protected.30	
Designated	 or	 limited	 public	 forums	 must	 protect	 First	 Amendment	 freedoms	
	 26.	 This	concern	was	central	to	the	district	court’s	holding	in	the	American Library Ass’n	case.	See	
id. at	469–70.
	 27.	 The	Fourteenth	Amendment	includes	the	provision	that	“No	State	shall	make	or	enforce	any	
law	which	shall	abridge	the	privileges	or	immunities	of	citizens	of	the	United	States;	nor	shall	any	State	
deprive	any	person	of	 life,	 liberty,	or	property,	without	due	process	of	 law;	nor	deny	to	any	person	
within	its	jurisdiction	the	equal	protection	of	the	laws.”	U.s. const.	amend.	XIV,	§1.	This	restriction	
applies	only	to	state	actors.	See, e.g.,	Hudgens	v.	NLRB,	424	U.S.	507,	513	(1976)	(“It	is,	of	course,	a	
commonplace	that	the	constitutional	guarantee	of	free	speech	is	a	guarantee	only	against	abridgment	
by	government,	federal	or	state.”	(citing	Columbia	Broad.	Sys.,	Inc.	v.	Democratic	Nat’l	Comm.,	412	
U.S.	94	(1973)));	Lovell	v.	City	of	Griffin,	303	U.S.	444,	450	(1938)	(“It	is	also	well	settled	that	munici-
pal	ordinances	adopted	under	state	authority	constitute	state	action	and	are	within	the	prohibition	of	
the	amendment.”).
	 28.	 The	lower	court	in	American Library Ass’n	explained:	“Because	we	find	that	the	plaintiff	pub-
lic	libraries	are	funded	and	controlled	by	state	and	local	governments,	they	are	state	actors,	subject	to	
the	constraints	of	the	First	Amendment,	as	incorporated	by	the	Due	Process	Clause	of	the	Fourteenth	
Amendment.”	ALA I,	201	F.	Supp.	2d	at	450	n.20.
	 29.	 The	New	York	Public	Library	was	found	not	to	be	a	state	actor	for	civil	rights	claims	because	
it	is	only	partially	supported	with	public	funds	and	because	by	the	terms	of	its	contract	with	the	state	
and	by	practice	it	maintains	control	over	the	library	independent	of	the	city	or	state.	See	Gilliard	v.	
N.Y.	Pub.	Library	Sys.,	597	F.	Supp.	1069	(S.D.N.Y.	1984).	The	standard	of	“under	color	of	state	law”	is	
used	when	plaintiffs	file	civil	suits	claiming	violations	of	civil	rights	under	42	U.S.C.	§	1983,	and	this	
standard	is	similar	to	that	for	a	state	actor.	See	Hollenbaugh	v.	Carnegie	Free	Library,	545	F.2d	382	(3d	
Cir.	1976).	
	 30.	 Courts	recognize	as	traditional	public	forums	only	those	settings	which	have	for	“time	out	
of	mind,	.	.	.	been	used	for	purposes	of	assembly,	communication	of	thoughts	between	citizens,	and	
discussing	public	questions,”	and	libraries	have	not	met	this	standard.	ALA II,	539	U.S.	at	205	(quoting 
Int’l	Soc’y	for	Krishna	Consciousness,	Inc.	v.	Lee,	505	U.S.	672,	679	(1992)).
350 LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL Vol. 102:3  [2010-21]
according	to	their	commitments	to	do	so,31	and	nonpublic	forums	must	meet	rela-
tively	minimal	 requirements	under	 the	First	Amendment.32	Library	 cases	 are	 all	
over	 the	map	 in	 terms	 of	 forum	 analysis.	 Some	 library	 cases	 predate	 or	 ignore	
modern	forum	analysis;	some	have	found	public	libraries	to	be	designated	public	
forums	 for	 the	 limited	 purpose	 of	 the	 right	 to	 receive	 information;	 and	 others,	
most	 notably	United States v. American Library Ass’n,	 suggest	 forum	 analysis	 is	
inapplicable	to	public	libraries’	decisions	about	which	private	speech	to	make	avail-
able	to	the	public,	indicating	that	the	library	is	either	a	nonpublic	forum	or	simply	
not	a	forum	at	all.33	
¶16	Because	law	libraries	have	not	been	the	subject	of	First	Amendment	litiga-
tion,	 law	 librarians	must	 turn	 to	 cases	 about	other	publicly	 funded	 libraries	 for	
guidance	 about	 First	 Amendment	 law.	 Community	 public	 libraries	 and	 school	
libraries	are	the	subjects	of	most	challenges,	but	the	law	of	these	libraries	may	not	
map	directly	onto	law	libraries.	Generally,	courts	will	measure	the	library’s	compli-
ance	with	the	First	Amendment	by	the	conformity	of	the	collection	decisions	to	the	
library’s	mission,	so	differences	in	mission	produce	differences	in	legal	obligations.	
Viewed	along	a	continuum	of	obligations	under	the	First	Amendment,	courts	may	
require	the	most	neutrality	from	public	libraries	with	missions	to	serve	entire	com-
munities,	slightly	less	neutrality	from	law	libraries	with	missions	to	serve	particular	
patron	groups’	 legal	 research	needs,	 and	 even	 less	neutrality	 from	public	 school	
libraries	whose	mission	is	even	narrower	because	of	its	link	to	the	inculcative	and	
curricular	roles	of	schools.34	
The Right to Receive Information
¶17	The	right	most	often	raised	in	library	First	Amendment	cases	is	the	right	to	
receive	information	as	a	function	of	freedom	of	speech	and	of	the	press.	One	of	the	
principled	problems	of	library	First	Amendment	law	relates	to	this	right	to	receive	
information	 through	 the	 library.35	Courts	 are	 reluctant	 to	 characterize	 the	 First	
Amendment	as	a	positive	 right	 that	 requires	 the	government	 to	affirmatively	do	
something,	such	as	purchase	a	particular	book	or	even	keep	it	on	the	shelves.	The	
“abridgment”	 language	 of	 the	Amendment	 could	mean	 that	 the	 right	 is	 only	 a	
negative	right	to	prevent	government	regulation	that	diminishes	or	interferes	with	
	 31.	 To	create	a	designated	public	forum,	“the	government	must	make	an	affirmative	choice	to	
open	up	its	property	for	use	as	a	public	forum.”	Id.	at	206.	To	create	a	limited	public	forum	the	gov-
ernment	may	designate	a	government	property	or	program	as	a	public	forum	“for	certain	groups	or	
for	the	discussion	of	certain	topics.”	Good	News	Club	v.	Milford	Cent.	Sch.,	533	U.S.	98,	106	(2001)	
(quoting	Rosenberger	v.	Rector	&	Visitors	of	Univ.	of	Va.,	515	U.	S.	819,	829	(1995)).
	 32.	 Generally,	 courts	have	 found	 that	 government	properties	 or	programs	 that	 are	not	 tradi-
tional	 or	 designated	 public	 forums	 are	 by	 default	 nonpublic	 forums,	 but	 a	 relatively	 new	 fourth	
category	of	“not	[a]	for[um]	at	all”	may	also	exist.	Ark.	Educ.	Television	Comm’n	v.	Forbes,	523	U.S.	
666,	677	(1998).
	 33.	 See ALA II,	539	U.S.	at	204.	
	 34.	 In	dissenting	in	Pico,	Justice	Rehnquist	wrote,	“Unlike	university	or	public	libraries,	elemen-
tary	and	secondary	school	libraries	are	not	designed	for	freewheeling	inquiry	.	.	.	.”	Bd.	of	Educ.	v.	Pico	
(Pico III),	457	U.S.	853,	915	(1982)	(Rehnquist,	J.,	dissenting).	
	 35.	 See Susan	Nevelow	Mart,	The Right to Receive Information,	95	LAw Libr. J.	175,	2003	LAw Libr. 
J.	11.
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any	of	the	protected	activities.	Under	this	view	of	the	First	Amendment,	a	library’s	
removal	of	a	book	from	the	collection	would	leave	a	patron	no	worse	off	than	if	the	
library	were	never	created	or	the	book	was	never	added	to	the	library’s	collection.	
In	contrast,	a	 law	 that	prohibited	 the	community	 from	reading	 that	book	would	
violate	 the	 negative	 right	 that	 prevents	 government	 from	 abridging	 the	 right	 to	
receive	information.	The	distinction	is	one	between	government	subsidies	and	gov-
ernment	regulations.	This	view	of	the	First	Amendment	as	a	negative	right	could	
mean	that	the	First	Amendment	simply	does	not	apply	to	government	subsidies	like	
public	libraries.	No	matter	what	a	library	does—acquire,	remove,	or	filter—the	bot-
tom	line	is	that	libraries	can	only	make	affirmative	or	positive	contributions	to	the	
reading	options	of	their	communities,	so	they	could	not	violate	a	negative	right	to	
receive	information.	
¶18	But	modern	courts	have	rejected	this	absolutist	view	of	the	First	Amendment	
as	a	negative	right	inapplicable	to	subsidies	like	libraries.36	Courts	have	character-
ized	some	library	actions	as	abridgments37	and	at	times	have	embraced	the	concept	
of	a	positive	right	of	access	to	information	through	public	libraries.38	Once	libraries	
make	information	available,	courts	have	found	that	removal	of	that	material	must	
meet	 First	 Amendment	 doctrinal	 tests	 because	 that	 removal	 could	 constitute	
abridgment	 and	 violate	 negative	 First	 Amendment	 rights.39	 Some	 courts	 have	
found	that	libraries	reflect	a	commitment	to	support	the	right	to	receive	informa-
tion,	which	in	turn	requires	the	library	to	protect	access	under	the	more	stringent	
requirements	for	limited	public	forums.40	Nonetheless,	the	library	cases	reveal	sig-
nificant	 judicial	 discomfort	 with	 the	 positive	 right	 implications	 of	 a	 First	
Amendment	right	to	receive	information.41
Evidence and Judicial Workload Concerns Limit  
Judicial Review to Removal of Books 
¶19	In	some	cases,	courts	have	determined	that	the	proper	way	to	apply	the	First	
Amendment	to	libraries	is	to	prohibit	decisions	based	on	intent	to	suppress	access	
to	particular	ideas.42	This	approach	requires	judges	to	determine	the	intent	of	the	
librarian	 in	 acquiring,	 rejecting,	 or	 removing	 a	 book.	However,	 traditional	 book	
selection	presents	evidentiary	and	workload	challenges	courts	do	not	welcome.43	
	 36.	 On	 the	 topic	 of	 government	 subsidies	 and	 free	 expression,	 see	 generally	 Seth	 F.	 Kreimer,	
Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State,	 132	U. pA. L. rev.	 1293	
(1984);	Martin	H.	Redish	&	Daryl	I.	Kessler,	Government Subsidies and Free Expression,	80	minn. L. 
rev.	543	(1996).
	 37.	 See Pico III,	457	U.S.	853	(plurality	opinion).	
	 38.	 Kreimer	v.	Bureau	of	Police,	958	F.2d	1242	(3d	Cir.	1992).	
	 39.	 See Pico III,	457	U.S.	853	(plurality	opinion);	ACLU	v.	Miami-Dade	County	Sch.	Bd.,	557	F.3d	
1177	(11th	Cir.), cert. denied,	130	S.	Ct.	659	(2009).	
	 40.	 Kreimer,	958	F.2d	1242;	Neinast	v.	Bd.	of	Trs.,	346	F.3d	585	(6th	Cir.	2003).	
	 41.	 See Pico III,	457	U.S.	at	889	(Burger,	C.J.,	dissenting)	(arguing	that	recognition	of	a	right	to	
receive	information	was	an	improper	creation	of	an	affirmative	right	and	would	make	a	public	library	
a	“slavish	courier	of	the	material	of	third	parties”).
	 42.	 Id. (plurality	opinion);	ACLU v.	Miami-Dade,	557	F.3d	1177.	
	 43.	 The	 same	 approach	 could	 apply	 to	 review	 of	 decisions	 about	 other	 tangible	 materials	
in	 a	 library’s	 collection,	 although	 the	 decision	 to	 add	 or	 remove	 a	 subscription	 to	 a	 journal	 or	 a	
352 LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL Vol. 102:3  [2010-21]
Traditionally,	librarians	review	and	select	new	materials	on	a	title-by-title	basis,	and	
the	process	can	 involve	complex	comparative	assessments	of	potential	purchases	
and	local	needs.	The	process	does	not	usually	produce	evidence	that	would	reveal	
intent	to	suppress	a	particular	idea	or	viewpoint.	These	evidentiary	and	workload	
challenges	have	led	courts	to	reject	standard	First	Amendment	review	of	library’s	
acquisition	decisions.44	Book	relocation	or	removal	decisions,	in	contrast,	are	fewer	
in	number	and	more	often	produce	a	 trail	of	 evidence	 that	 can	be	 reviewed	 for	
discriminatory	intent.	Courts	have	noted	that	the	lowered	evidentiary	and	work-
load	 barriers	 make	 removal	 and	 relocation	 cases	 more	 appropriate	 for	 First	
Amendment	judicial	review.45
Proposals for Constitutional Protection of Libraries’ Discretion
¶20	Several	 scholarly	proposals	would	give	 libraries	 constitutional	protection	
based	on	the	libraries’	right	to	free	speech,	not	just	First	Amendment	accommoda-
tion	 for	 their	discretion	 to	manage	 their	 collections.46	Libraries	 themselves	have	
made	this	argument—in	American Library Ass’n	the	libraries	argued	that	Congress	
should	not	be	permitted	to	condition	federal	subsidies	on	libraries’	installation	of	
Internet	filters	because	those	conditions	would	violate	a	library’s	First	Amendment	
free	speech	right	to	manage	its	collection	without	interference.47	In	another	case,	a	
library	argued	that	library	patrons	should	not	be	able	to	interfere	with	the	library’s	
right	to	install	Internet	filtering	software.48	
¶21	So	far,	no	court	has	held	a	public	library’s	collection	management	consti-
tutes	protected	 speech	under	 the	First	Amendment.	The	American Library Ass’n 
Court	acknowledged	that	this	argument	would	not	be	consistent	with	precedent,	
monographic	 series	may	 in	 fact	have	a	better	 record	of	evidence	 for	a	court	 to	review,	 since	 these	
decisions	are	less	numerous	than	decisions	about	individual	books.	Law	libraries	tend	to	have	more	
subscriptions	than	book	titles,	and	courts	might	be	just	as	reluctant	to	review	subscription	decisions	
because	of	the	complexity	of	the	factors	that	go	into	decisions	to	add,	cancel,	or	withdraw.	
	 44.	 See United	States	v.	Am.	Library	Ass’n (ALA II),	539	U.S.	194,	241–42	(2003)	(Souter,	J.,	dis-
senting,	joined	by	Ginsburg,	J.);	Pico	v.	Bd.	of	Educ.	(Pico II), 638	F.2d	404,	413–14	(2d	Cir.	1980),	
aff ’d,	457	U.S.	853	(1982).	
	 45.	 ALA II,	539	U.S.	at	242	(Souter,	J.,	dissenting,	joined	by	Ginsburg,	J.)	(citing	the	plurality’s	
conclusion	in	Pico III). 
	 46.	 David	Fagundes,	State Actors as First Amendment Speakers,	100	nw. U.L. rev.	1637	(2006)	
(proposing	recognition	as	protected	government	speech	based	on	relevance	to	the	institutional	mis-
sion	and	on	positive	impact	on	public	discourse);	Felix	Wu,	United	States	v.	American	Library	Ass’n: 
The Children’s Internet Protection Act, Library Filtering, and Institutional Roles,	 19	berkeLey tech. 
L.J.	 555	 (2004)	 (arguing	 that	 libraries’	discretion	 to	 filter	 the	 Internet	 is	 a	 form	of	 speech	activity	
deserving	of	First	Amendment	protection). But see Erwin	Chemerinsky,	Moving to the Right, Perhaps 
Sharply to the Right,	 12	green bAg	 2d	 413	 (2009)	 (arguing	 that	 the	 government	 speech	 doctrine	
threatens	protection	of	individuals’	First	Amendment	rights);	Andy	G.	Olree,	Identifying Government 
Speech,	42	conn. L. rev.	365	(2009)	(stating	that	the	ALA II and	Pico III decisions	show	the	Court	is	
not	willing	to	recognize	library	collections	as	government	speech).
	 47.	 ALA II,	539	U.S.	at	210–11.
	 48.	 The	defendant	library	in	Bradburn v. North Central Regional Library District	argued	that	its	
“role	as	a	public	library	carries	with	it	the	right	and	responsibility	to	make	content-based	judgments	
about	what	to	include	in	the	collection.”	Defendant’s	Opening	Brief	at	28, Bradburn	v.	N.	Cent.	Reg’l	
Library	Dist.,	231	P.3d	166	(Wash.	2010).	
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but	the	Court	also	specifically	declined	to	rule	on	the	question	in	that	case.49	First	
Amendment	status	for	a	 library’s	collection	management	authority	could	further	
complicate	questions	of	the	relative	authority	among	those	involved	in	library	col-
lection	challenges.	If	libraries	were	to	have	government	speech	rights,	then	so	might	
other	 government	 bodies	 that	 would	 regulate	 the	 library.	 As	 a	 result,	 conflicts	
among	 patrons,	 libraries,	 and	 library	 regulators	 could	 frame	 all	 of	 the	 parties’	
claims	as	First	Amendment	claims.	
¶22	Other	proposals	would	give	 libraries	or	 librarians	constitutional	 status	as	
trustworthy	experts	in	balancing	both	First	Amendment	and	library	management	
concerns.50	 Under	 this	 theory,	 libraries	 or	 librarians	 would	 have	 some	 First	
Amendment	immunity	from	the	challenges	of	 library	patrons	and	the	regulatory	
authority	of	other	government	bodies.	While	courts	have	allowed	libraries	special	
accommodations	 under	 First	Amendment	 law,	 courts	 have	 not	 granted	 libraries	
authority	as	First	Amendment	institutions.	Another	theory	of	protection	for	aca-
demic	law	librarians	or	law	libraries	as	collection	managers	is	academic	freedom,	
but	the	constitutional	status	of	academic	freedom	is	largely	unresolved.51	
¶23	The	survey	of	the	library	cases	that	follows	demonstrates	that	courts	have	
not	 accepted	 any	 proposal	 that	 would	 give	 libraries	 absolute	 discretion	 in	 book	
selection	and	Internet-access	management.	The	boundaries	of	courts’	willingness	
to	defer	to	libraries	are	fuzzy,	but	even	the	deferential	standard	of	the	plurality	in	
American Library Ass’n	 suggests	 limits,	 and	 lower	 courts	have	 continued	 to	 treat	
libraries’	discretion	as	limited.	
	 49.	 See ALA II,	539	U.S.	at	210–11;	but see	id. at	226	(Stevens,	J.,	dissenting)	(“[A]	library’s	exer-
cise	of	judgment	with	respect	to	its	collection	is	entitled	to	First	Amendment	protection.”);	Ark.	Educ.	
Television	Comm’n	v.	Forbes,	523	U.S.	666,	674	(1998)	(“When	a	public	broadcaster	exercises	editorial	
discretion	in	the	selection	and	presentation	of	its	programming,	it	engages	in	speech	activity.”).
	 50.	 Proposals	for	 institutional	deference	or	even	autonomy	generally	advocate	this	recognition	
for	public	 libraries	or	offer	 guidelines	 that	would	encompass	public	 libraries.	See	Lee	C.	Bollinger,	
Public Institutions of Culture and the First Amendment: The New Frontier,	 63	U. cin. L. rev.	 1103	
(1995);	Bruce	C.	Hafen,	Hazelwood	School	District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions,	1988	
dUke L.J.	685; Paul	Horwitz,	Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard 
Questions,	54	UcLA L. rev.	1497	(2007);	Frederick	C.	Schauer,	Principles, Institutions, and the First 
Amendment,	112	hArv. L. rev.	84,	115	(1998).	Some	proposals	would	extend	protection	to	the	deci-
sions	of	librarians	but	not	library	boards.	See Jim	Chen,	Mastering Eliot’s Paradox: Fostering Cultural 
Memory in an Age of Illusion and Allusion,	 89	minn. L. rev. 1361,	1379	 (2005);	Robert	M.	O’Neil,	
Libraries, Librarians and First Amendment Freedoms,	4	hUm. rts.	295,	309	(1975);	Rodney	A.	Smolla,	
Freedom of Speech for Libraries and Librarians,	85	LAw Libr. J.	71,	73	(1993);	Mark	G.	Yudof,	Library 
Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean Point,	59	ind. L.J.	527,	553–55	
(1984).	
	 51.	 See Bintliff	 &	 Danner,	 supra	 note	 3;	 see also Gemma	Devinney,	Academic Librarians and 
Academic Freedom in the United States: A History and Analysis,	37	Libri 24 (1986). Academic	freedom	
has	not	been	afforded	a	clear	status	under	the	First	Amendment.	See	J.	Peter	Byrne,	Neo-orthodoxy in 
Academic Freedom,	88	tex. L. rev. 143	(2009)	(reviewing	mAtthew w. finkin & robert c. post, for 
the common good: principLes of AmericAn AcAdemic freedom (2009) and	stAnLey fish, sAve the 
worLd on yoUr own time (2008)). 
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the U.S. Supreme court Has given Increasing Latitude to Libraries
Three Cases Demonstrate Variation in Facts and Analysis 
¶24	The	Supreme	Court	has	ruled	on	three	cases	considering	the	application	of	
the	First	Amendment	to	libraries.	Public	community	libraries	were	the	subject	of	
two	cases,	 and	a	public	 school	 library	was	 the	context	 for	 the	 third.	These	cases	
provide	thin	guidance	on	how	a	library	should	manage	its	collection	because	none	
produced	majority	opinions	with	clear	 rules	of	First	Amendment	application	 to	
public	 libraries.	 In	 the	 first	 case,	 the	majority	applied	a	high	 level	of	 scrutiny	 to	
breach	of	peace	convictions	for	a	public	library	sit-in	protesting	the	library’s	policy	
of	segregation,	but	only	four	Justices	found	First	Amendment	freedoms	had	been	
violated.52	In	the	second	case,	a	majority	agreed	a	trial	was	necessary	to	discover	the	
intent	 behind	 removal	 of	 books	 from	 school	 libraries,	 but	 only	 four	 Justices	
asserted	that	intent	to	suppress	ideas	would	offend	the	First	Amendment.53	And	in	
the	third	case,	the	majority	upheld	federal	library	subsidies	that	are	conditioned	on	
Internet	filtering,	but	under	three	separate	theories.54	Although	these	decisions	lack	
the	clarity	and	authority	of	majority	opinions,	each	contributes	to	an	understand-
ing	of	the	current	boundaries	to	libraries’	discretion	to	manage	their	collections.	
Brown v. Louisiana 
¶25	The	first	time	the	Supreme	Court	considered	the	applicability	of	the	First	
Amendment	 to	 a	 public	 library	was	 in	Brown v. Louisiana.55	Only	 four	 Justices	
found	the	First	Amendment	applied,	but	a	majority	of	the	Court	was	unwilling	to	
defer	to	local	authorities	on	whether	library	patron	behavior	was	consistent	with	
the	mission	of	the	library.	The	case	did	not	focus	on	the	library’s	collection,56	but	
the	 holding	 and	 discussion	 has	 influenced	 the	 First	 Amendment	 law	 of	 public	
library	collection	management.	
¶26	Brown v. Louisiana was	decided	in	1966,	more	than	a	decade	after	the	more	
famous	Brown decision	that	 led	 to	 integration	of	public	schools.57	 In	 the	 library	
case,	the	Supreme	Court	reviewed	the	convictions	of	five	young	African	American	
men	under	a	state	breach	of	peace	statute	for	remaining	quietly	in	a	public	library	
for	about	fifteen	minutes	after	they	had	been	asked	by	the	library	staff	to	leave.	The	
small	branch	library	in	Clinton,	Louisiana,	was	known	locally	to	be	a	segregated	
facility	serving	the	white	community.	The	five	young	men	tested	the	segregation	
policy	 through	a	planned	visit	 that	 included	a	 request	 for	 a	book	 followed	by	 a	
quiet	sit-in.58	Mr.	Brown	requested	a	book,	and	the	library	staff	member	identified	
	 52.	 See Brown	v.	Louisiana,	383	U.S.	131	(1966)	(plurality	opinion).
	 53.	 See Bd.	of	Educ.	v.	Pico	(Pico III),	457	U.S.	853	(1982)	(plurality	opinion).
	 54.	 See United	States	v.	Am.	Library	Ass’n (ALA II),	539	U.S.	194	(2003)	(plurality	opinion).
	 55.	 Brown v. Louisiana,	383	U.S.	131.
	 56.	 Access	 to	 information	was	not	 directly	 at	 issue.	The	 library	 staff	member	 provided	 fairly	
extensive	service.	The	facts	are	unclear	as	to	which	book	was	sought,	whether	it	was	a	title	by	Booker	
T.	Washington	or	by	Arna	Bontemps.	A	novel	claim	might	have	sought	a	right	to	access	to	“Negro	
Literature,”	which	the	whites-only	Clinton	branch	was	unlikely	to	have	in	its	collection.	See	kArLA f.c. 
hoLLAwAy,	A Negro Library, in bookmArks: reAding in bLAck And white: A memoir	28	(2006).
	 57.	 Brown	v.	Bd.	of	Educ.,	347	U.S.	483	(1954).
	 58.	 Actually,	only	one	of	 the	men,	Quincy	Brown,	was	able	 to	sit,	because	only	one	chair	was	
available	for	library	patrons	in	the	small	branch	library.	The	four	other	men	stood	beside	Mr.	Brown.	
Brown v. Louisiana,	383	U.S.	at	135–36.
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a	similar	title	in	the	central	library	and	arranged	to	have	it	mailed	to	Mr.	Brown.	He	
and	his	companions	then	remained	quietly	in	the	library	and	refused	two	requests	
by	library	staff	to	leave.	Having	received	advance	notice	of	the	sit-in	from	its	orga-
nizer,	the	Congress	of	Racial	Equality,	the	sheriff	and	some	officers	arrived	ten	to	
fifteen	minutes	after	the	young	men.	When	the	men	refused	the	sheriff ’s	request	to	
leave,	the	sheriff	arrested	them.	All	of	the	young	men	were	convicted	under	the	state	
breach	of	peace	statute.59	
¶27	The	state	breach	of	peace	statute	contained	no	avenue	for	appeal	through	
state	courts,	so	the	convictions	were	appealed	directly	to	the	Supreme	Court.	The	
central	disagreement	on	the	Court	was	whether	the	actions	of	the	library	patrons	
were	consistent	with	use	of	the	library	for	library	purposes.	A	majority	of	the	Court	
declined	to	defer	to	the	library	staff	or	local	law	enforcement	who	maintained	that	
the	young	men	had	violated	library	norms	by	remaining	in	the	library	after	receiv-
ing	 library	 service.	 Justice	 Fortas	 authored	 the	 prevailing	 opinion	 and	 expressed	
regret	 that	 “a	 public	 library—a	 place	 dedicated	 to	 quiet,	 to	 knowledge,	 and	 to	
beauty”	 should	be	 the	 stage	 for	 confrontation,	 but	 concluded	 that	no	peace	was	
breached	by	the	five	men’s	behavior.60	The	opinion	went	further,	finding	that	con-
victions	 violated	 the	men’s	 rights	 to	 silent	 speech,	 assembly,	 and	petitioning	 the	
Government	for	redress	under	the	First	Amendment.61	Fortas	conceded	that	a	state	
and	its	instrumentalities	“may,	of	course,	regulate	the	use	of	its	libraries,”	but	added	
that	the	regulations	must	be	nondiscriminatory	in	policy	and	as	applied	when	indi-
viduals	are	exercising	constitutional	rights.62	
¶28	Justice	Brennan	concurred	in	the	judgment.63	Justice	White	concurred	only	
in	the	result,	and	based	reversal	of	the	convictions	on	the	finding	that	“petitioners	
were	making	only	a	normal	and	authorized	use	of	this	public	library	.	.	.	.”64
¶29	The	dissent,	written	by	Justice	Black,	found	the	sit-ins	were	not	consistent	
with	the	purpose	of	public	libraries	and	therefore	could	constitutionally	be	prohib-
ited	by	state	statute.	The	dissent	said	the	Court’s	holding	meant	states	were	“para-
lyzed	with	reference	to	control	of	their	libraries	for	library	purposes	.	.	.	.”65	
¶30	The	four	Justices’	enforcement	of	First	Amendment	protections	in	Brown is	
particularly	striking	given	that	local	authorities	had	closed	the	library	after	the	sit-
in.66	In	the	library	collection	cases	that	came	later,	courts	generally	accommodated	
the	 library’s	 management	 requirements	 and	 relaxed	 First	 Amendment	 require-
ments	through	deference	to	local	authorities.67	Underlying	this	accommodation	is	
implicit	recognition	that	standard	First	Amendment	enforcement	of	neutral	treat-
ment	of	speech	and	the	press	would	be	impossible	for	the	library	due	to	its	need	to	
	 59.	 Id.	at	137–38.
	 60.	 Id. at	142.
	 61.	 Id.	at	141–42.	
	 62.	 Id. at	143.	
	 63.	 Id. at	143	(Brennan,	J.,	concurring).	Justice	Brennan	preferred	to	overturn	the	convictions	on	
the	basis	of	a	prior	Court	holding	that	the	Louisiana	breach	of	peace	law	was	overbroad.	Id. at	146–47.
	 64.	 Id.	at	151	(White,	J.,	concurring).
	 65.	 Id.	at	165	(Black,	J.,	dissenting,	joined	by	Clark,	Harlan,	and	Stewart,	JJ.).
	 66.	 The	library	was	still	closed	at	the	time	of	the	Brown decision,	almost	two	years	after	the	sit-in.	
See id. at	151	(White,	J.,	concurring).
	 67.	 See infra	¶¶	33–44	for	a	discussion	of	ALA II	and	Pico III.
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manage	scarce	resources,	and	the	library	would	have	no	alternative	but	to	close.68	
Even	if	somehow	scarcity	did	not	prevent	the	library’s	compliance	with	standard	
First	Amendment	requirements	for	neutral	treatment	of	speech	and	the	press,	full	
enforcement	might	be	inconsistent	with	the	library’s	locally	fashioned	mission,	and	
the	library	would	have	to	change	its	purpose	or	close	because	its	purpose	was	frus-
trated	by	the	First	Amendment.69	So	courts	tend	to	adjust	First	Amendment	stan-
dards	for	library	collections	to	allow	them	to	be	selective,	whether	for	reasons	of	
scarcity	or	design.	In	Brown	the	Court	faced	this	ultimate	irreconcilability	of	First	
Amendment	enforcement	and	the	 library’s	purpose,	at	 least	as	 that	purpose	was	
defined	by	local	authorities.	Rather	than	cope	with	additional	sit-ins	and	presum-
ably	integration,	the	local	authorities	closed	the	library.70	The	Court’s	willingness	
to	enforce	First	Amendment	protections	even	against	this	backdrop	of	the	discon-
tinuation	of	 library	service	was	no	doubt	strengthened,	if	not	dominated,	by	the	
force	of	 interwoven	equal	protection	concerns.71	 If	 the	 library	had	not	been	 the	
target	of	the	silent	speech	and	petition	activities,	the	Court	may	not	have	found	the	
exercise	of	those	rights	was	consistent	with	the	purpose	of	the	library.72	Nonetheless,	
Brown established	precedent	for	judicial	review	of	rules	for	library	patron	behavior,	
and	four	Justices	created	persuasive	authority	for	protection	of	First	Amendment	
freedoms	of	silent	speech,	assembly,	and	petition	in	the	public	library	setting.	
¶31	Even	though	Brown did	not	address	application	of	the	First	Amendment	to	
the	library’s	decisions	about	its	collection,	the	opinion	has	influenced	lower	court	
cases	about	collection	management.	Brown v. Louisiana’s	 three-Justice	prevailing	
opinion	is	quoted	in	library	cases	for	the	characterization	of	a	library	as	“a	place	
dedicated	to	quiet,	to	knowledge,	and	to	beauty.”73	As	courts	have	developed	doc-
	 68.	 See also Ark.	 Educ.	 Television	Comm’n	 v.	 Forbes,	 523	U.S.	 666,	 681–82	 (1998)	 (avoiding	
application	of	standard	First	Amendment	requirements	because	public	broadcasters	might	choose—
and	 indeed	 the	 Nebraska	 Educational	 Television	 Network	 did	 so	 in	 the	 state’s	 1996	 U.S.	 Senate	
race—to	 cancel	 an	 election	 debate	 rather	 than	 provide	 time	 for	 all	 ballot-qualified	 candidates	 to	
participate).
	 69.	 The	American Library Ass’n	 plurality	opinion	 found	 that	public	 libraries	were	 selective	 in	
their	 collections	 as	 a	matter	of	design.	United	States	 v.	Am.	Library	Ass’n (ALA II),	 539	U.S.	 194,	
204–09	(2003).
	 70.	 One	 library	 journal	 report	questioned	 the	given	motivation,	 saying	 that	 the	 closing	 came	
just	a	few	weeks	after	the	incident	without	any	general	public	knowledge	that	plans	for	closing	had	
already	been	 in	progress.	“This	plan	 is	 supposed	 to	 save	 lots	of	money,	but	mostly	 (and	of	course	
they	don’t	admit	this)	it	keeps	Negroes	safely	out	of	any	buildings	.	.	.	.”	Lockouts and Arrests—Repeat 
Performance,	wiLson Libr. bULL., sept.	1964,	at	22.	The	attorney	for	Louisiana	explained	in	oral	argu-
ment	that	the	library	was	unable	to	find	staff	willing	to	keep	the	library	open	after	the	sit-in	because	
of	fears	that	there	would	“be	trouble.”	Oral	Argument,	Brown	v.	Louisiana	(No.	65-41),	audio available 
at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1965/1965_41.	
	 71.	 Courts	have	accepted	 this	 trade-off	 in	 the	equal	protection	context.	Palmer	v.	Thompson,	
403	U.S.	 217	 (1971)	 (holding	 that	 the	 closing	 of	 public	 swimming	 pools	 rather	 than	 integrating	
them	was	facially	racially	neutral	and	therefore	not	in	violation	of	the	equal	protection	clause).	But 
see Deborah	L.	Brake,	When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of Leveling Down in 
Equality Law,	46	wm. & mAry L. rev.	513	(2004).
	 72.	 Mark	 Yudof	 suggested	 Brown	 may	 be	 “better	 understood	 as	 a	 race	 case	 than	 a	 First	
Amendment	 one.”	mArk g. yUdof,	when government speAks: poLitics, LAw, And government 
expression in AmericA	227	n.42	(1983).
	 73.	 Brown	v.	Louisiana,	383	U.S.	131,	142	(1966)	 (plurality	opinion).	The	Third	Circuit	cited	
Brown	as	authority	for	finding	a	public	library	to	be	a	limited	public	forum	for	the	right	to	receive	
information.	See Kreimer	v.	Bureau	of	Police,	958	F.2d	1242,	1261	(3d	Cir.	1992).
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trine	to	identify	the	types	of	First	Amendment	rights	protected	in	public	libraries,	
the	Brown decision	has	been	authority	for	upholding	patron	behavior	regulations	
that	require	use	of	the	library	to	be	quiet	and	for	recognition	of	the	library’s	role	in	
supporting	 access	 to	 speech	 but	 not	 in	 facilitating	 direct	 expression.74	 Some	 of	
these,	 in	 turn,	have	 formed	 the	basis	 for	 judicial	 review	of	 libraries’	decisions	 to	
restrict	access	to	particular	books	or	Internet	content.75	
¶32	Brown	 also	 serves	 as	 a	 reminder	 to	 libraries	 that	 when	 equal	 protection	
issues	are	intertwined	with	First	Amendment	issues,	courts	may	not	extend	as	much	
deference	 to	 the	 library.	 For	 example,	 if	 an	 academic	 law	 library	 specifically	
excluded	from	its	collection	any	materials	on	the	history	of	slavery	in	the	United	
States	or	rejected	all	donations	of	resources	on	the	law	of	women’s	sports	while	col-
lecting	the	law	of	men’s	sports,	the	library	might	be	called	upon	to	defend	its	deci-
sion	 as	 a	 function	 of	 something	 other	 than	 an	 intention	 to	 suppress	 access	 to	
certain	ideas.
Board of Education v. Pico
¶33	The	second	Supreme	Court	opinion	that	addressed	a	public	library	and	the	
First	 Amendment	 was	 a	 challenge	 to	 school	 library	 book	 removal	 in Board of 
Education v. Pico in	1982.76	The	Pico Court	was	even	more	fractured	than	the	Brown 
Court.	The	case	produced	opinions	in	the	district	court,	circuit	court,	and	Supreme	
Court.	At	the	Supreme	Court	level,	the	decision	included	six	separate	opinions.	The	
Supreme	Court	majority	agreed	only	to	reverse	the	district	court’s	summary	judg-
ment	 in	favor	of	the	school	system	and	remand	for	a	trial	 for	factual	determina-
tions.	Four	Justices	from	the	majority	also	agreed	on	a	standard	for	the	trial	court	
to	determine	whether	the	motivation	in	removal	of	books	from	school	libraries	was	
impermissible	under	the	First	Amendment.	Despite	the	confusion	of	opinions	and	
lack	of	binding	authority	of	any	of	them,	Pico has	had	an	impact	on	lower	court	
opinions	 involving	 both	 school77	 and	 public	 library	 collections,78	 and	 the	 local	
actors	treated	the	Court’s	remand	as	a	cue	to	restore	the	challenged	books	to	library	
shelves.	
¶34	The	 case	 arose	 in	 response	 to	 the	 Island	Trees	 school	 board’s	 decision	 to	
remove	particular	books	from	the	school	system’s	libraries.	Members	of	the	school	
board	identified	several	books	in	the	Island	Trees	high	school	and	junior	high	school	
libraries	as	a	“‘moral	danger’”	to	students	and	“‘anti-American,	anti-Christian,	anti-
Sem[i]tic,	and	just	plain	filthy	.	.	.	.’”79	The	board	appointed	a	committee	of	parents	
	 74.	 Kreimer,	958	F.2d	at	1261;	see also Neinast	v.	Bd.	of	Trs.,	346	F.3d	585,	591	(6th	Cir.	2003)	
(stating	that	“[t]he	First	Amendment	protects	the	right	to	receive	information”	and	citing	Kreimer	for	
“the	right	to	some	level	of	access	to	a	public	library,	the	quintessential	locus	of	the	receipt	of	informa-
tion”).	
	 75.	 See Sund	 v.	City	 of	Wichita	 Falls,	 121	F.	 Supp.	 2d	 530,	 547	 (N.D.	Tex.	 2000);	Mainstream	
Loudoun	v.	Bd.	of	Trs.	(Loudoun I),	2	F.	Supp.	2d	783,	792	(E.D.	Va.	1998).
	 76.	 Bd.	of	Educ.	v.	Pico	(Pico III),	457	U.S.	853	(1982)	(plurality	opinion).
	 77.	 See ACLU	v.	Miami-Dade	County	Sch.	Bd.,	557	F.3d	1177,	1199–1200	(11th	Cir.), cert. denied, 
130	S.	Ct.	659	(2009).	
	 78.	 See Kreimer,	958	F.2d	at	1253;	Sund,	121	F.	Supp.	2d	at	547;	Loudoun I,	2	F.	Supp.	2d	at	792.	
	 79.	 Pico III,	457	U.S.	at	857	(quoting	Pico	v.	Bd.	of	Educ. (Pico I),	474	F.	Supp.	387,	390	(E.D.N.Y.	
1979)).	 The	 books	 at	 issue	were	Kurt	Vonnegut,	 Jr.’s	Slaughter House Five,	Desmond	Morris’s	The 
Naked Ape,	Piri	Thomas’s	Down These Mean Streets,	 the	Langston	Hughes-edited	Best Short Stories 
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and	school	staff	to	determine	the	books’	“‘educational	suitability,’	‘good	taste,’	‘rele-
vance,’	and	‘appropriateness	to	age	and	grade	level.’”80	The	board	rejected	most	of	
the	committee’s	recommendations	and	returned	only	one	book	to	the	library	with-
out	restriction	and	made	one	other	available	only	with	parental	approval.	Four	high	
school	students	and	one	junior	high	school	student	filed	suit	for	violation	of	state	
and	federal	free	speech	rights.	
¶35	The	district	court	ruled	in	favor	of	the	school	board’s	motion	for	summary	
judgment,	holding	that	the	board’s	decision	did	not	meet	the	school	library	context	
standard	of	a	“sharp	and	direct	infringement	of	any	first	amendment	right.”81	The	
plaintiffs	appealed,	and	the	Second	Circuit	overturned	the	district	court’s	summary	
judgment	and	remanded	for	full	factual	determination	of	the	basis	of	the	school	
board’s	decisions.	
¶36	The	 Island	Trees	 school	 board	 appealed,	 and	 a	majority	 of	 the	 Supreme	
Court	affirmed	the	Second	Circuit’s	 reversal	of	 summary	 judgment	and	remand	
for	a	trial.	The	three-Justice	prevailing	opinion	declared	that	a	school	library	col-
lection	required	less	judicial	deference	than	the	school	curriculum.	Quoting	Brown 
v. Louisiana, Justice Brennan	equated	the	school	library	to	the	public	library	as	“a	
place	dedicated	to	quiet,	to	knowledge,	and	to	beauty.”82	In	contrast	with	decisions	
about	which	books	to	acquire,	the	removal	of	books	was	found	to	be	both	more	
suspect	 as	 idea	 suppression	 and	more	 easily	 reviewed	 for	 intent.	 The	 prevailing	
opinion	also	traced	the	evolution	of	a	right	to	receive	information	and	found	that	
right	could	be	at	issue	in	the	removal	of	school	library	books.	
¶37	This	limitation	on	the	school	libraries’	collection	discretion	was	supported	
by	only	four	Justices,	so	no	majority	opinion	in	Pico	set	a	standard	for	what	is	per-
missible	or	impermissible	library	book	removal.	Justice	Blackmun	concurred	with	
the	three-Justice	prevailing	opinion	that	the	trial	court	should	find	the	school	book	
removal	impermissible	if	the	school	board’s	intention	was	to	“‘prescribe	what	shall	
be	 orthodox	 in	 politics,	 nationalism,	 religion,	 or	 other	 matters	 of	 opinion.’”83	
Because	motivation	might	 be	 a	mixed	 bag	 of	 reasons,	 the	 district	 court	 was	 to	
determine	whether	 denial	 of	 access	 to	 ideas	was	 the	“decisive	 factor,”	which	 the	
opinion	further	defined	as	a	“substantial	factor.”84	On	the	other	hand,	if	the	court	
determined	that	the	decisive	factor	for	the	board	was	that	the	books	were	“perva-
sively	 vulgar”	 or	 lacking	 in	 “educational	 suitability,”	 students	 challenging	 their	
removal	had	conceded	that	the	action	would	be	constitutional.	
¶38	Justice	White	concurred	only	in	the	judgment	and	explained	that	the	issue	
might	be	resolved	on	remand	to	the	trial	court	without	need	to	address	issues	of	
constitutional	law	if	the	court	found	the	motivation	was	one	that	the	parties	had	
agreed	was	permissible.85	
of Negro Writers,	 the	 anonymously	 authored	Go Ask Alice,	Oliver	LaFarge’s	Laughing Boy,	Richard	
Wright’s	Black Boy,	Alice	Childress’s	A Hero Ain’t Nothin’ but a Sandwich,	and	Eldridge	Cleaver’s	Soul 
on Ice.	Id. at	856	n.3.
	 80.	 Id. at	857.
	 81.	 Pico I, 474	F.	Supp.	at	397,	rev’d,	638	F.2d	404	(2d	Cir.	1980),	aff ’d,	457	U.S.	853	(1982).
	 82.	 Pico III,	457	U.S.	at	868 (quoting	Brown	v.	Louisiana,	383	U.S.	131,	142	(1966)).
	 83.	 Id.	at	872	(Blackmun,	J.,	concurring)	(quoting	W.	Va.	Bd.	of	Educ.	v.	Barnette,	319	U.S.	624,	
642	(1943)).
	 84.	 Id. at	871	n.22	(plurality	opinion).
	 85.	 See id.	at	883	(White,	J.,	concurring).
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¶39	 Justices	 Burger,	 Powell,	 Rehnquist,	 and	O’Connor	 each	 wrote	 dissenting	
opinions.	All	 of	 the	 dissenters	 would	 have	 extended	 broad	 judicial	 deference	 to	
school	boards	in	the	management	of	school	library	collections	in	support	of	their	
inculcative	missions.	Justice	Rehnquist	wrote,	“[u]nlike	university	or	public	librar-
ies,	 elementary	 and	 secondary	 school	 libraries	 are	not	designed	 for	 freewheeling	
inquiry	.	.	.	.”86	But	Justice	Rehnquist’s	dissent	also	indicates	a	widely	shared	agree-
ment	on	the	Court	that	school	libraries	do	not	have	unlimited	discretion	in	collec-
tion	 decisions.	 In	 response	 to	 Justice	 Brennan’s	 hypothetical	 examples	 of	
impermissible	removal	of	all	books	favoring	Republicans	or	of	all	books	supporting	
racial	equality,	Justice	Rehnquist	wrote	that	he	could	“cheerfully	concede”	that	the	
First	Amendment	would	not	support	such	suppression	of	ideas.87	
¶40	 After	 the	 Supreme	 Court’s	 remand	 for	 trial,	 the	 Island	 Trees	 Board	 of	
Education	voted	to	return	the	books	in	question	to	the	library	shelves	to	avoid	fur-
ther	litigation.88	The four-Justice Pico standard	for	review	of	book	removal	from	a	
school	 library	 is	 not	 binding	 authority,	 but	 it	 continues	 to	 serve	 as	 persuasive	
authority	to	the	lower	courts.89	In	addition,	Justice	Rehnquist’s	dissent	contributes	
an	 important	 indicator	 that	 a	 strong	majority	of	 the	Court	 agreed	 that	 libraries’	
discretion	was	limited	even	in	the	school	library	context.	
¶41	The	key	lesson	from	Pico	for	libraries	may	be	that	book	removal	could	be	
particularly	suspect,	and	evidence	of	an	intention	to	prevent	access	to	an	idea	could	
raise	First	Amendment	questions.	Although	the	Pico	standard	addresses	only	book	
removal,	a	publicly	funded	library	would	be	wise	to	avoid	policies	or	practices	that	
suggest	an	intent	to	suppress	access	to	an	idea.	If	a	state	law	library	collected	only	
works	by	Republicans	and	not	Democrats,	even	courts	reluctant	to	review	library	
collection	 decisions	 would	 probably	 rule	 that	 the	 practice	 violates	 the	 First	
Amendment.	And	 if	 a	 county	 law	 library	 rejected	 books	 arguing	 against	 voting	
rights	 for	 women,	 the	 library	 might	 be	 called	 upon	 to	 explain	 that	 the	 books	
addressed	 legal	 issues	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 limited	 resources	 and	mission	 to	
acquire	materials	related	to	current	practice	needs	in	the	community.	Similarly,	if	
an	academic	law	library	were	to	reject	books	about	the	influence	of	Christianity	on	
the	nation’s	founders	or	books	with	racist	views,	the	library	might	need	to	articulate	
reasons	such	as	existing	collection	coverage	of	 these	arguments	 in	order	to	avoid	
challenges	of	 intent	 to	 suppress	 the	 ideas.	Although	 courts	would	probably	only	
review	book	removal	decisions	under	the	Pico	plurality	standard,	the	test	can	serve	
as	a	reminder	to	librarians	during	the	selection	process	as	well,	so	that	the	librari-
	 86.	 Id.	at	915	(Rehnquist,	J.,	dissenting).	However,	in	American Library Ass’n,	Justice	Rehnquist	
wrote	 for	 the	 plurality	 that	 public	 libraries	 have	missions	 that	 require	 them	 to	 selectively	 provide	
access	to	content.	See United	States	v.	Am.	Library	Ass’n (ALA II),	539	U.S.	194,	211	(2003)	(plurality	
opinion).
	 87.	 Pico III, 457	U.S.	at	907–08	(Rehnquist,	J.,	dissenting)	(“I	would	save	for	another	day—feel-
ing	quite	confident	 that	 that	day	will	not	arrive—the	extreme	examples	posed	 in	 Justice	Brennan’s	
opinion.”).
	 88.	 In	a	formal	statement,	the	Board	said	it	wanted	to	avoid	a	trial	because	that	“would	have	the	
effect	of	surrendering	local	control	of	the	schools	to	the	courts.”	Shawn	G.	Kennedy,	School Board on 
L.I. Votes to Restore 9 Banned Books,	n.y. times,	Aug.	13,	1982,	at	B1.	
	 89.	 See ACLU	v.	Miami-Dade	County	Sch.	Bd.,	557	F.3d	1177,	1199–1200	(11th	Cir.), cert. denied,	
130	S.	Ct.	659	(2009).	
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an’s	 own	 distaste	 for	 an	 idea	 does	 not	 preclude	 the	 idea’s	 representation	 in	 the	
collection.	
United States v. American Library Ass’n
¶42	The	third	case	in	which	the	Supreme	Court	addressed	the	First	Amendment’s	
application	in	libraries	is	the	2003	decision	United States v. American Library Ass’n,	
where	public	library	Internet	filtering	was	at	issue.	Librarians	may	believe	Internet	
management	 is	 different	 from	 collection	 management,	 but	 a	 plurality	 of	 the	
Supreme	Court	found	that	library	Internet	access	is	“‘no	more	than	a	technological	
extension	of	the	book	stack.’”90	Thus,	the	holding	in	American Library Ass’n	is	an	
important	 indicator	of	 how	much	discretion	 law	 libraries	have	 in	both	of	 these	
areas.
¶43	Ironically,	the	Court’s	recognition	of	libraries’	discretion	in	collection	mat-
ters	caused	plaintiff	libraries	and	library	associations	to	lose	their	First	Amendment	
challenge	 to	 the	 Children’s	 Internet	 Protection	Act	 (CIPA),	 which	 they	 claimed	
would	induce	libraries	to	violate	the	First	Amendment	rights	of	their	patrons.	The	
CIPA	statute	conditioned	federal	discounts	on	Internet	access	in	public	and	school	
libraries	on	the	installation	of	a	“technology	protection	measure”	to	prevent	access	
by	all	persons	to	“visual	depictions”	that	are	“obscene”	or	“child	pornography”	and	
to	protect	minors	from	access	to	“visual	depictions”	that	are	“harmful	to	minors.”91	
The	 parties	 agreed	 that	 commercial	 filtering	 software	 overblocked	 and	 under-
blocked,	and	that	even	if	technologically	perfect,	the	statutory	requirements	for	the	
filters	would	restrict	adult	viewers	to	content	suitable	for	children.	The	Act	required	
that	filters	be	applied	to	all	Internet	access	in	libraries	receiving	federal	funding	and	
provided	 permissive	 but	 not	 mandatory	 conditions	 under	 which	 library	 staff	
might	decide	to	disable	the	filters.92
¶44	Most	 law	 librarians	have	devoted	 little	attention	 to	 the	American Library 
Ass’n	decision	because	law	libraries	and	university	libraries	do	not	qualify	as	poten-
tial	recipients	of	the	funding	and	discounts	available	through	CIPA.	However,	the	
decision	has	much	to	say	about	how	law	libraries	might	or	might	not	be	able	to	
limit	patrons’	access	to	protected	speech	through	the	Internet	or	even	how	libraries	
might	be	able	to	edit	or	excerpt	material	from	their	print	collections.	While	most	
law	librarians—indeed	most	librarians—would	not	dream	of	hiding	controversial	
books	or	taking	a	razor	to	pages	containing	objectionable	but	legitimate	content,	
law	librarians	might	consider	Internet	filtering	in	order	to	serve	the	same	or	similar	
purposes	as	the	CIPA	statute.93	
¶45	By	the	time	of	the	American Library Ass’n case,	First	Amendment	doctrine	
had	adopted	public	forum	analysis	to	determine	the	level	of	 judicial	scrutiny	for	
different	contexts.	The	American Library Ass’n district	court	used	forum	analysis	to	
	 90.	 United	States	v.	Am.	Library	Ass’n (ALA II),	539	U.S.	194,	207	 (2003)	 (plurality	opinion)	
(quoting	s. rep. no. 106-141,	at	7	(1999)).	
	 91.	 Children’s	Internet	Protection	Act	(CIPA),	47	U.S.C.	§	254(h)(6)(B),	(C)	(2006);	20	U.S.C.	
§	9134(f)(1)	(2006).	
	 92.	 Id.	§§	254,	9134.
	 93.	 See Ruth	A.	Fraley,	Internet Filtering in the Workplace,	AALL spectrUm, Apr.	2001,	at 10.
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determine	 that	 public	 libraries’	 Internet	 access	 represented	 a	 dedicated	 public	
forum	and	failed	to	meet	strict	standards	for	conformity	with	the	First	Amendment	
principles	of	neutral	treatment	of	speech	and	the	press.	
¶46	A	provision	in	CIPA provided	for	appeal	directly	to	the	Supreme	Court.94	A	
five-Justice	majority	of	the	Court	found	that	the	high	level	of	scrutiny	was	inap-
propriate	 for	public	 library	Internet	 filtering.95	Yet	 the	Court	could	not	muster	a	
majority	opinion.	The	four-Justice	plurality	opinion,	authored	by	Justice	Rehnquist,	
held	that	public	libraries	require	and	merit	broad	discretion	to	make	content-based	
decisions	in	collection	and	Internet	management	because	their	very	purpose	is	to	
provide	selective	access	to	information.96	Because	the	CIPA	Internet	filter	categories	
were	found	to	be	content-based,	CIPA	did	not	induce	libraries	to	go	beyond	their	
allowed	 discretion	 under	 the	 First	 Amendment.	 The	 Court	 likened	 the	 public	
library	to	two	other	institutions	that	had	received	similar	deference:	editorial	dis-
cretion	 in	 public	 broadcasting	 as	 recognized	 in	Arkansas Educational Television 
Commission v. Forbes97	and	aesthetic	assessments	in	awarding	of	national	funding	
for	the	arts	as	held	in	National Endowment for Arts v. Finley.98	
¶47	The	plurality	opinion	in	American Library Ass’n does	not	discuss	the	limits	
of	libraries’	collection	management	discretion.	The	plurality	only	suggests	that	the	
content-based	Internet	filtering	was	reasonable	in	light	of	the	library’s	purpose.99	
But	 the	multiple	opinions	 reveal	 a	widely	 shared	assumption	among	 the	 Justices	
that	 if	 libraries	did	not	disable	 the	 filters	 for	patrons	 to	 gain	 access	 to	protected	
speech,	that	refusal	could	be	unreasonable	in	light	of	the	libraries’	mission.100	Justice	
	 94.	 20	U.S.C.	§	7001	note	(2006).
	 95.	 See ALA II, 539	U.S.	at	204–09	(plurality	opinion);	id. at	215–17	(Breyer,	J.,	concurring).	
	 96.	 Id.	at	204–09	(plurality	opinion).	Rather	than	drawing	on	his	Pico	dissent,	in	which	he	wrote	
that	public	libraries	were	“designed	for	freewheeling	inquiry,”	Bd.	of	Educ.	v.	Pico	(Pico III),	457	U.S.	
853,	915	 (1982) (Rehnquist,	 J.,	dissenting,	 joined	by	Burger,	C.J.,	 and	Powell,	 J.),	 Justice	Rehnquist	
wrote	 that	 the	 public	 library’s	mission	was	 to	 provide	 only	“material	 of	 requisite	 and	 appropriate	
quality	for	educational	and	informational	purposes.”	ALA II,	539	U.S.	at	211.	
	 97.	 Id. at	204	(citing	Ark.	Educ.	Television	Comm’n	v.	Forbes, 523	U.S.	666,	672–73	(1998)).	
	 98.	 Id. at	205	(citing	Nat’l	Endowment	for	the	Arts	v.	Finley, 524	U.S.	569,	585–86	(1998)). 
	 99.	 Despite	 the	 determination	 that	 forum	 analysis	 was	 inappropriate,	 the	 prevailing	 opinion	
worked	through	and	rejected	both	traditional	and	designated	public	forum	status	for	public	library	
Internet	access.	This	analysis	would	normally	imply	that	the	public	library’s	collection	was	a	nonpub-
lic	 forum,	the	default	 for	government	property	rejected	as	traditional	or	designated	public	 forums.	
In	a	nonpublic	 forum,	content-based	decisions	are	held	to	a	standard	of	reasonableness	 in	 light	of	
the	purpose	of	the	forum,	but	viewpoint-based	decisions	are	still	prohibited.	The	plurality	equated	
libraries	with	public	broadcasters,	which	the	Court	held	to	be	nonpublic	forums,	and	with	federal	arts	
awards,	which	the	Court	reviewed	for	viewpoint	discrimination,	a	review	consistent	with	nonpublic	
forum	standards.	Forbes,	523	U.S.	at	680–82 (holding	that	a	public	television	candidates’	debate	was	
a	nonpublic	forum	in	which	viewpoint	discrimination	is	forbidden	and	other	content-based	distinc-
tions	must	be	 reasonable	 in	 light	of	 the	 institutional	purpose).	See Finley,	 524	U.S.	 at	580–81,	587	
(finding	decency	criteria	for	arts	awards	to	be	merely	advisory	and	so	not	viewpoint	discrimination,	
but	suggesting	that	a	calculated	attempt	to	suppress	certain	ideas	or	viewpoints	would	be	unconsti-
tutional).	See infra	¶	60	 for	a	discussion	of	Crosby	v.	S.	Orange	County	Cmty.	Coll.	Dist.,	172	Cal.	
App.	4th	433,	443	(Cal.	Ct.	App.	2009)	(interpreting	American Library Ass’n as	finding	libraries	to	be	
nonpublic	forums).	
	 100.	 The	 three	 dissenters	 and	 Justice	 Kennedy	 in	 his	 concurrence	 emphasized	 the	 potential	
unconstitutionality	of	permanent	filters	that	block	lawful	speech.	ALA II,	539	U.S.	at	224	(Stevens,	J.,	
dissenting);	id. at	233 (Souter,	J.,	dissenting,	joined	by	Ginsburg,	J.);	id. at	214–15	(Kennedy,	J.,	concur-
ring);	id.	at	219	(Breyer,	J.,	concurring)	(describing	unblocking	as	“an	important	exception”	to	CIPA	
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Stevens	would	have	given	 the	policy	of	deference	 to	 libraries	 the	weight	of	First	
Amendment	protection,	which	would	have	made	the	CIPA	conditions	unconstitu-
tional	 violations	 of	 the	 libraries’	 rights.101	 Justice	 Souter’s	 dissent	 applied	 strict	
scrutiny	to	the	actions	a	library	could	take	under	CIPA and	found	it	“would	simply	
be	censorship.”102	In	all,	eight	of	the	Justices	found	the	ability	of	adult	patrons	to	
gain	access	to	protected	Internet	speech	to	be	important	to	the	constitutionality	of	
the	library’s	use	of	Internet	software	filters.	
¶48	The	 impact	 of	American Library Ass’n	 continues	 to	 be	measured.	 Lower	
courts	continue	to	recognize	some	rights	of	access	to	information	through	public	
libraries,	but	they	no	longer	categorize	public	libraries	as	limited	public	forums	or	
apply	strict	scrutiny	in	library	cases.	Library	literature	is	replete	with	conclusions	
that	the	American Library Ass’n decision	directs	libraries	to	disable	filters	for	access	
to	legal	content	upon	request	by	adult	patrons.103	On	the	other	hand,	some	states,	
counties,	and	municipalities	have	passed	laws	to	require	library	Internet	policies	or	
CIPA-like	filtering	of	the	Internet	in	public	 libraries	within	their	 jurisdictions.104	
The	first	case	to	test	American Library Ass’n’s	implicit	requirement	to	disable	filters	
for	adults	who	request	full	access	found	that	the	Washington	state	constitution	only	
requires	a	public	library	to	unblock	access	to	web	sites	that	meet	the	library’s	mis-
sion,	 policy,	 and	 CIPA	 compliance.105	 Nonetheless,	 many	 public	 libraries	 have	
refused	 to	 apply	 for	 federal	 CIPA funding,	 citing	 both	 their	 refusal	 to	 filter	 the	
Internet	and	the	burdensome	application	process	for	CIPA funds.106	Law	librarians	
filtering	requirements).	Even	the	plurality	implied	that	overblocking	software	might	raise	constitu-
tional	problems	when	Rehnquist	wrote	that	“any	such	concerns	are	dispelled	by	the	ease	with	which	
patrons	may	have	 the	 filtering	 software	disabled.”	 Id.	 at	209	(Rehnquist,	C.J.,	 joined	by	O’Connor,	
Scalia,	and	Thomas,	JJ.).
	 101.	 See id.	 at	 226	 (Stevens,	 J.,	 dissenting)	 (citing	 Keyishian	 v.	 Bd.	 of	 Regents,	 385	 U.S.	 589	
(1967)).
	 102.	 Id.	at	234–35	(Souter,	J.,	dissenting,	joined	by	Ginsburg,	J.).	
	 103.	 The	 American	 Library	 Association	 interpreted	 the	 decision	 to	 require	 libraries	 to	 dis-
able	 filters	or	unblock	particular	sites	 for	requesting	adults.	CIPA	Decision	Response:	A	Statement	
from	 ALA	 President	 Carla	 D.	 Hayden	 and	 the	 ALA	 Executive	 Board	 1–2	 (July	 25,	 2003),	 avail-
able at	 http://0-www.ala.org.sapl.sat.lib.tx.us/Template.cfm?Section=archive&template=/content
management/contentdisplay.cfm&ContentID=39847;	 Mary	 Minow,	 Lawfully Surfing the Net: 
Disabling	Public Library Internet Filters to Avoid More Lawsuits in the United States,	first mondAy, 
Apr.	5,	2004,	http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1132/1052.
	 104.	 See, e.g.,	 Danielle	 Sottosanti,	 Oro Valley Council Gives Its Approval to Filtering of 
Internet Porn at Library,	Ariz. dAiLy stAr,	Feb.	15,	2007,	at	9	 (describing	 library	 Internet	 filters	as	
subject	 to	discretionary	unblocking	by	 librarians	on	 library	 computers	 but	not	 to	be	disabled	 for	
library	wireless	Internet	access);	see also Nat’l	Conference	of	State	Legislatures, State	Internet	Filtering	
Laws,	 http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/telecommunicationsinformationtechnology/stateinternet
filteringlaws/tabid/13491/default.aspx	(last	updated	Dec.	28,	2009)	(providing	a	chart	showing	that	a	
minority	of	states	have	laws	requiring	public	libraries	to	develop	acceptable	use	policies).	
	 105.	 Bradburn	 v.	 N.	 Cent.	 Reg’l	 Library	 Dist.,	 231	 P.3d	 166	 (Wash.	 2010).	 This	 question	
was	certified	to	the	Washington	State	Supreme	Court	from	the	federal	District	Court	for	the	Eastern	
District	of	Washington.	Application	of	the	state	constitutional	finding	to	the	facts	of	the	case	was,	at	
the	time	of	this	writing,	pending	with	the	district	court.	The	federal	constitutional	questions	were	
also	pending	with	the	district	court.	See	Bradburn v. N. Cent. Reg’l Library Dist., No. CV-06-0327-EFS, 
2008	WL	4460018	(E.D.	Wash.	2008).
	 106.	 In	 2007,	 43.8%	 of	 public	 libraries	 reported	 that	 they	 did	 not	 apply	 for	 federal	 E-Rate	
discounts	for	Internet	access.	Thirty-eight	percent	cited	the	complicated	process,	36%	cited	the	low	
value	of	the	discount	compared	with	time	needed	to	participate,	and	33.9%	cited	the	need	to	comply	
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have	not	weighed	in	heavily	on	this	subject,	and	most	appear	to	continue	to	provide	
unfiltered	access	to	the	Internet.107
¶49	Law	libraries	can	look	to	American Library Ass’n	for	authority	that	Internet	
filters	designed	to	address	problems	of	access	to	illegal	content	or	even	simply	pri-
oritize	 access	 to	 information	 in	 support	 of	 a	 collection	 policy	 are	 likely	 to	 be	
upheld.	The	safest	approach,	though,	may	be	to	provide	procedures	for	unblocking	
particular	web	sites	and	disabling	the	filter	upon	request.	
the Lower courts fill in the gaps
 Libraries as Limited Public Forums for the Right to Receive Information
¶50	After	Pico and	before	American Library Ass’n, the	lower	courts	developed	a	
line	of	opinions	that	increased	the	level	of	First	Amendment	scrutiny	courts	gave	to	
libraries’	 decisions.	 These	 cases	 shaped	 recognition	 of	 libraries	 as	 limited	 public	
forums	for	the	right	to	receive	information.	Several	cases	reviewed	regulations	of	
library	patrons	and	found	in	favor	of	the	libraries.	In	challenges	to	libraries’	deci-
sions	 to	 restrict	 access	 to	 particular	 materials	 through	 a	 Braille	 program,	 the	
Internet,	or	by	relocation	of	books,	courts	held	libraries	had	violated	library	users’	
rights	to	receive	information.	
¶51	Playboy magazine	was	the	subject	of	conflict	in	a	District	of	Columbia	fed-
eral	 district	 court	 case	 of	 American Council of the Blind v. Boorstin	 in	 1986.108	
Considering	 the	 case	 just	 a	 few	 years	 after	Pico,	 the	 district	 court	 held	 that	 the	
Library	 of	 Congress	 practice	 of	 providing	 Braille	 copies	 of	 popular	 magazines	
through	the	Library’s	Program	for	 the	Blind	and	Physically	Handicapped	consti-
tuted	 a	 nonpublic	 forum	 in	which	 viewpoint	 discrimination	was	 not	 permitted.	
The	case	involved	a	challenge	to	the	decision	of	the	Librarian	of	Congress	to	dis-
continue	the	production	of	Braille	copies	of	Playboy	magazine	after	a	Congressman	
was	successful	in	securing	a	funding	decrease	for	the	program	equal	to	the	cost	of	
providing	 the	Braille	 copies	of	Playboy.	The	 court	 found	 that	 the	 elimination	of	
Playboy	 from	 the	 program	was	 because	 of	 its	 sexually	 oriented	 content	 and	was	
viewpoint	 discrimination,	 and	 the	 court	 directed	 the	 Librarian	 to	 reinstate	 the	
Braille	production	and	distribution	of	 the	magazine.	The	court	said,	“[a]lthough	
individuals	have	no	right	to	a	government	subsidy	or	benefit,	once	one	is	conferred,	
as	it	is	here	through	the	allocation	of	funds	for	the	program,	the	government	can-
not	deny	it	on	a	basis	 that	 impinges	on	freedom	of	speech.”109	The	district	court	
went	to	some	effort	to	uncover	the	intent	of	the	Librarian,	including	noting	that	he	
had	overruled	his	staff ’s	recommendations.	The	district	court	did	not	cite	the	Pico	
decision,	but	the	focus	on	a	factual	determination	of	the	basis	for	the	removal	of	
the	 title	 from	 the	 program	 was	 similar	 to	 the	 analysis	 in	 the	 Pico school	 book	
removal	case.
with	CIPA’s	filtering	requirements	as	reasons	for	not	applying	for	the	E-Rate	discounts.	John	Carlo	
Bertot,	Charles	R.	McClure	&	Paul	T.	Jaeger,	The Impacts of Free Public Internet Access on Public Library 
Patrons and Communities,	78	Libr. Q.	285,	294	(2008).
	 107.	 See Fraley,	supra	note	93,	at	10.
	 108.	 Am.	Council	of	the	Blind	v.	Boorstin,	644	F.	Supp.	811	(D.D.C.	1986).
	 109.	 Id. at	815.
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¶52	The	Third	Circuit	was	the	first	court	to	recognize	public	libraries	as	limited	
public	forums	for	the	right	to	receive	information.	The	court’s	opinion	in	Kreimer 
v. Bureau of Police,110	 ten	 years	 after	 Pico, did	 not	 concern	 the	 content	 of	 the	
library’s	collection,	but	rather	regulations	on	user	behavior	and	hygiene.	Richard	
Kreimer,	 a	 homeless	 man	 who	 frequented	 the	Morristown	 public	 library,	 chal-
lenged	his	ejection	from	the	library	for	violating	library	policies	that	regulated	user	
behavior	and	hygiene.	Kreimer	argued	that	the	library’s	policies	were	impermissi-
bly	vague	and	overbroad	and	in	violation	of	his	First	Amendment	and	due	process	
rights	under	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.111	
¶53	The	Third	Circuit	reversed	the	district	court’s	summary	judgment	for	Mr.	
Kreimer.	The	circuit	court	embraced	“the	positive	right	of	public	access	to	infor-
mation	and	ideas”	and	determined	that	although	the	right	to	receive	information	
may	be	overcome	by	 significant	 competing	 interests,	 it	did	 include	“the	 right	 to	
some	 level	of	access	 to	a	public	 library,	 the	quintessential	 locus	of	 the	receipt	of	
information.”112	The	Kreimer court	reviewed	the	Pico decision	and	distinguished	
the	 inculcative	role	of	 school	 libraries	 from	the	role	of	public	 libraries	and	con-
cluded	that	 the	Morristown	 library	was	a	 limited	designated	public	 forum	dedi-
cated	“to	aid	in	the	acquisition	of	knowledge	through	reading,	writing	and	quiet	
contemplation.”113	 The	 circuit	 court	 evaluated	 whether	 each	 challenged	 library	
patron	 rule	prohibited	 activities	 that	were	within	or	 beyond	 the	purpose	of	 the	
library	as	a	limited	public	forum.	Rules	that	prohibited	behavior	inconsistent	with	
the	 library’s	 purposes	 were	 upheld	 under	 a	 reasonableness	 standard.	 Personal	
grooming	requirements	were	subjected	to	strict	scrutiny	because	library	users	sub-
ject	to	this	restriction	could	be	using	the	library	for	its	intended	purpose	and	yet	
be	in	violation	of	the	policy,	but	the	court	upheld	these	requirements	as	well.114	
¶54	In	1998,	a	federal	district	court	in	Virginia	cited	Kreimer	as	the	only	case	to	
have	examined	whether	a	public	library	constituted	a	limited	public	forum.	In	two	
connected	decisions,	the	Virginia	federal	district	court	in	Mainstream Loudoun v. 
Board of Trustees considered	the	constitutionality	of	Internet	filtering	in	the	public	
library.115	The	Loudoun	County	library	board	of	trustees	had	adopted	a	“Policy	on	
Internet	Sexual	Harassment”	in	order	to	install	commercial	Internet-filtering	soft-
ware	and	prevent	access	to	child	pornography,	obscenity,	and	material	considered	
harmful	to	juveniles.116	A	local	nonprofit	group	and	individuals	from	the	county	
sued	 for	 violation	 of	 their	 First	Amendment	 rights	 to	 receive	 protected	 speech,	
both	 because	 the	 software	 blocked	 beyond	 the	 library	 board’s	 categories	 and	
because	adults	were	restricted	to	content	suitable	for	minors.	Procedures	for	dis-
	 110.	 Kreimer	v.	Bureau	of	Police,	958	F.2d	1242	(3d	Cir.	1992).
	 111.	 Id.	at	1249.
	 112.	 Id. at	1255.
	 113.	 Id.	at	1261.
	 114.	 See id. at	1262–64.
	 115.	 Mainstream	 Loudoun	 v.	 Bd.	 of	 Trs.	 (Loudoun I),	 2	 F.	 Supp.	 2d	 783	 (E.D.	 Va.	 1998)	
(denying	the	defendant’s	motion	to	dismiss	and	for	summary	 judgment);	Mainstream	Loudoun	v.	
Bd.	of	Trs.	(Loudoun II), 24	F.	Supp.	2d	552	(E.D.	Va.	1998).	
	 116.	 The	 filtering	 also	 prevented	 access	 to	 e-mail	 and	 chat	 rooms,	 and	 all	 computers	 were	
positioned	 to	 be	 in	 full	 view	 of	 library	 staff.	 These	 provisions,	 however,	 were	 not	 at	 issue	 in	 the	
Mainstream Loudoun	case.	Loudoun II,	24	F.	Supp.	2d	at	556.
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abling	were	 also	 challenged	 as	 burdens	 on	 First	Amendment	 rights.	 The	 library	
board	argued	that	the	library	“could	constitutionally	prohibit	access	to	speech	sim-
ply	because	 it	was	authored	by	African-Americans,	or	because	 it	espoused	a	par-
ticular	political	viewpoint,	for	example	pro-Republican.”117	
¶55	The	Mainstream Loudoun court	 found	that	 the	 library	board	 intended	to	
create	 county	 libraries	“for	 the	 limited	 purposes	 of	 the	 expressive	 activities	 they	
provide,	 including	 the	 receipt	 and	 communication	 of	 information	 through	 the	
Internet.”118	The	 court	determined	 that	 Internet	 access	did	not	present	 the	 same	
scarcity	and	inculcative	mission	factors	that	justified	broad	deference	to	secondary	
school	 libraries	 in	Pico.119	The	 court	 applied	 strict	 scrutiny	 to	 the	 content-based	
restrictions	of	 the	Internet	and	found	the	policy	failed	because	 it	did	not	serve	a	
government	interest	that	was	compelling,	and	also	that	it	was	not	narrowly	tailored	
to	serve	that	interest.	The	library	did	not	produce	empirical	evidence	to	support	its	
argument	that	full	access	to	the	Internet	created	a	hostile	or	harassing	environment	
for	employees	or	library	users,	and	the	library	had	not	employed	a	number	of	less	
restrictive	 approaches	 to	 limiting	 unwanted	 access	 to	 harmful	 or	 illegal	 content.	
The	court	also	found	that	the	Internet	filter	was	a	prior	restraint	on	speech	because	
the	policy	provided	inadequate	standards	and	procedural	safeguards	to	the	library	
staff	to	determine	when	and	how	to	disable	the	filter.	
¶56	 Two	 years	 later,	 a	 federal	 district	 court	 in	 Texas	 cited	 language	 in	 Pico,	
Kreimer, and	even	Brown v. Louisiana	in	holding	that	“[t]he	right	to	receive	infor-
mation	is	vigorously	enforced	in	the	context	of	a	public	library	.	.	.	.”120	In	Sund v. 
City of Wichita Falls, the	court	reviewed	community	members’	challenge	to	a	library	
board	resolution	that	allowed	library	card	holders	to	petition	for	the	relocation	of	
offensive	books	from	the	children’s	section	of	the	library	to	the	section	for	adults.	
Two	 books	 in	 the	 library’s	 children’s	 collection,	Heather Has Two Mommies	 and	
Daddy’s Roommate,121	had	been	the	subject	of	much	debate	within	the	community.	
The	resolution	specified	that	300	signatures	out	of	the	community	of	100,000	resi-
dents	would	trigger	the	relocation	of	a	book	within	the	library.122	The	Sund	court	
held	that	the	public	library	was	a	limited	public	forum	for	the	right	to	receive	infor-
mation.	The	court	applied	strict	scrutiny	to	the	resolution	and	found	that	it	bur-
dened	 speech	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 both	 content	 and	 viewpoint.	 The	 court	 said	 that	
evidence	clearly	showed	the	purpose	of	the	resolution	was	to	suppress	access	to	the	
two	controversial	books.	The	court	held	that	the	resolution	did	not	serve	a	compel-
ling	government	interest	and	was	not	narrowly	tailored,	and	it	entered	a	permanent	
injunction	against	the	library	board	resolution.	
	 117.	 Loudoun I,	2	F.	Supp.	2d	at	792.
	 118.	 Loudoun II,	24	F.	Supp.	2d	at	563.	
	 119.	 This	 determination	 was	 made	 in	 the	 first	 opinion	 in	 the	 case,	 Loudoun I,	 2	 F.	 Supp. 2d	
at	795.
	 120.	 Sund	v.	City	of	Wichita	Falls,	121	F.	Supp.	2d	530,	547	(N.D.	Tex.	2000).
	 121.	 Id.	at	532.	Both	books	dealt	with	homosexual	parents.	
	 122.	 Id. at	 534.	 The	 court	made	much	 of	 the	 interference	 of	 the	 board	with	 the	 ability	 of	 the	
library	administrator	to	perform	her	duties	“as	a	trained,	skilled,	and	very	competent	professional.”	
The	court	noted	Ms.	Hughes’s	master’s	degree	in	library	science	and	her	adherence	to	a	code	of	ethics	
that	the	court	described	as	governing	professional	librarians.	Id.	at	541.	
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¶57	The	Sixth	Circuit	in	2003	considered	a	First	Amendment	and	due	process	
challenge	to	a	public	library’s	one-day	ejection	of	a	patron	for	violation	of	a	library	
policy	requiring	the	wearing	of	shoes.123	Neinast v. Board of Trustees was	decided	
three	months	after	American Library Ass’n,	but	 the	Sixth	Circuit	did	not	cite	 the	
Supreme	Court	opinion	or	make	use	of	its	rejection	of	forum	analysis	for	public	
libraries.	The	Sixth	Circuit	 found	the	 library	was	a	 limited	public	 forum	for	 the	
right	to	receive	information	but	upheld	the	district	court’s	summary	judgment	in	
favor	 of	 the	Columbus	 library.	 The	 circuit	 court	 found	 the	 library’s	 policy	 and	
process	did	not	directly	burden	the	right	to	receive	information	and	met	the	appli-
cable	standard	for	rationality.124	The	court	cited	Kreimer for	the	conclusion	that	a	
right	to	receive	information	included	“‘the	right	to	some	level	of	access	to	a	public	
library,	the	quintessential	locus	of	the	receipt	of	information.’”125	The	court	then	
cited	Kreimer, Sund, and Mainstream Loudoun	as	support	for	its	determination	that	
the	library	is	a	limited	public	forum	for	the	right	to	receive	information.126	
Nonpublic Forums and Procedural Due Process 
¶58	Since	American Library Ass’n,	lower	courts	have	largely	avoided	use	of	the	
limited	public	forum	designation	that	formed	the	basis	 for	the	 line	of	precedent	
established	by	Kreimer, Loudoun, Sund, and Neinast. However,	a	First	Amendment	
right	to	receive	information	through	a	public	library	survived	to	form	the	basis	for	
First	Amendment	and	due	process	challenges	 to	patron	regulations	and	Internet	
use	policies.	The	Pico standard	 for	 school	 library	book	 removal	 also	 survived	as	
nonbinding	 but	 useful	 authority.	 One	 court	 considered	American Library Ass’n	
authority	 for	 application	 of	 nonpublic	 forum	 status	 to	 a	 community	 college	
library’s	Internet	content	policies,	and	another	maintained	Kreimer was	authority	
for	limited	public	forum	analysis	for	review	of	patron	regulations.127	
¶59	A	right	to	receive	information	through	public	 library	Internet	access	was	
entitled	to	procedural	due	process	protection,	according	to	a	2004	federal	district	
court	in	North	Carolina.	In	Miller v. Northwest Region Library Board, the	court	said	
the	American Library Ass’n	 case	made	 clear	 that	 public	 libraries	 are	 entitled	 to	
restrict	access	to	Internet	sites	containing	visual	obscenity	or	child	pornography,	
but	that	“American Library Association	does	not	stand	for	the	proposition	that	no	
constitutional	protections	apply	to	Internet	computers	at	public	libraries.”128	The	
North	Carolina	district	court	cited	Kreimer	and	Neinast for	the	proposition	that	the	
First	Amendment	includes	the	“‘positive	right	of	public	access	to	information	and	
ideas’”	and	“‘the	right	to	some	level	of	access	to	a	public	library	.	.	.	.’”129	Based	on	
these	cases,	the	district	court	held	that	the	plaintiff,	who	viewed	Internet	pornog-
	 123.	 Neinast	v.	Bd.	of	Trs.,	346	F.3d	585	(6th	Cir.	2003).
	 124.	 See id. at	591–92.
	 125.	 Id.	at	591	(quoting	Kreimer	v.	Bureau	of	Police,	958	F.	2d	1242,	1255	(3d	Cir.	1992)).	
	 126.	 Id. 
	 127.	 Crosby	 v.	 S.	 Orange	 County	 Cmty.	 College	 Dist.,	 172	 Cal.	 App.	 4th	 433	 (Cal.	 Ct.	 App	
2009);	Hill	v.	Derrick,	No.	4:05-CV-1229,	2006	WL	1620226	(M.D.	Pa.	Jun.	8,	2006)	(applying	a	rea-
sonableness	standard	to	library	regulations	prohibiting	corporal	punishment	because	rules	did	not	
directly	impact	the	patron’s	right	to	receive	information	and	upholding	the	regulations).
	 128.	 Miller	v.	Nw.	Region	Library	Bd.,	348	F.	Supp.	2d	563,	569–70	(M.D.N.C.	2004).
	 129.	 Id. at	570	(quoting	Kreimer,	958	F.2d	at	1255).
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raphy	in	violation	of	library	policy,	was	entitled	to	due	process	before	being	banned	
from	the	library	system’s	Internet	computers.	Because	issues	of	fact	remained	unre-
solved,	the	Miller	court	also	denied	the	plaintiff ’s	motion	for	summary	judgment.	
¶60	In	2009,	 in	Crosby v. South Orange County Community College District, a	
California	district	court	applied	a	reasonableness	standard	of	review	to	the	com-
munity	college	library’s	Internet	use	policy.	The	college’s	policy	restricted	campus	
Internet	service,	including	in	the	college	library,	to	“appropriate	academic,	profes-
sional	and	institutional	purposes.”130	The	policy	also	prohibited	viewing	or	sending	
of	“obscene,	indecent,	profane,	lewd,	or	lascivious	material	or	other	material	which	
explicitly	or	implicitly	refers	to	sexual	conduct	.	.	.	.”131	A	college	student	challenged	
the	 policies	 after	 a	 campus	 police	 officer	 asked	 him	 to	 stop	 viewing	 MySpace	
images	the	officer	said	were	pornographic.	The	district	court	found	that	the	college	
library	was	analogous	to	a	public	library	and	cited	American Library Ass’n	in	deter-
mining	that	library	Internet	use	was	not	a	traditional	or	designated	public	forum.132	
The	 court	 reviewed	 the	 library	 Internet	 use	 policies	 as	 a	 nonpublic	 forum,	 and	
determined	that	they	met	standards	for	reasonableness	and	were	not	intended	to	
suppress	a	particular	viewpoint.133	
¶61	 A	 challenge	 to	 a	 library’s	 refusal	 to	 disable	 Internet	 filters	 was	 filed	 in	
Bradburn v. North Central Regional Library District.	 The	Washington	 Supreme	
Court	 ruled	 that	 state	 constitutional	 protections	 for	 speech	 did	 not	 require	 the	
library	 to	disable	 the	 filter	or	unblock	web	sites	 for	access	 to	all	 constitutionally	
protected	speech.	The	court	did	find	that	the	library	would	be	required	to	unblock	
access	 to	 sites	 inadvertently	overblocked	by	 the	 filtering	 software	 if	 the	web	 site	
content	was	consistent	with	the	library’s	mission,	collection	policy,	and	any	appli-
cable	 CIPA-compliance	 requirements.134	 Using	 the	 standards	 for	 a	 nonpublic	
forum,	the	court	held	that	 the	state	constitution	would	be	upheld	as	 long	as	 the	
library’s	filtering	policy	“is	reasonable	when	measured	in	light	of	the	library’s	mis-
sion	and	policies,	and	is	viewpoint	neutral.”135	The	application	of	the	facts	to	both	
Washington	 State	 and	 federal	 law	 remain	 within	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 federal	
district	court,	where	the	case	was	still	pending	at	the	time	of	this	writing.	
¶62	 The	 four-Justice	 Pico	 standard	 for	 review	 of	 book	 removal	 in	 a	 school	
library	 was	 accepted	 as	 persuasive	 authority	 in	 2009	 in	 the	 Eleventh	 Circuit	
upholding	of	the	removal	of	a	book	from	the	Miami-Dade	County	school	librar-
ies.136	 Neither	 the	 district	 court	 nor	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeals	 found	 the	American 
Library Ass’n opinion	 relevant	 enough	 to	merit	 distinguishing.	ACLU v. Miami-
Dade County School Board	involved	a	challenge	to	the	school	board’s	withdrawal	of	
	 130.	 Crosby,	172	Cal.	App.	4th	at	436	(quoting	the	District	Board’s	policy).
	 131.	 Id. at	438	(quoting	the	District	Board’s	policy).
	 132.	 Id. at	 443	 (citing United	 States	 v.	 Am.	 Library	 Ass’n (ALA II),	 539	 U.S.	 194,	 205–06	
(2003)).
	 133.	 Id. (citing	Perry Educ.	Ass’n	v.	Perry	Local	Educators’	Ass’n,	460	U.S.	37,	46	(1983)).
	 134.	 Bradburn	v.	N.	Cent.	Reg’l	Library	Dist.,	231	P.3d	166,	¶ 46	(Wash.	2010).
	 135.	 Id.	at	¶ 65.
	 136.	 The	 Eleventh	 Circuit	 accepted	 the	 Pico standard	 only	 as	 nonbinding	 authority.	 “With	
five	different	opinions	and	no	part	of	any	of	them	gathering	five	votes	from	among	the	nine	justices—
only	one	of	whom	is	still	on	the	Court—Pico	is	a	non-decision	so	far	as	precedent	is	concerned.	It	
establishes	no	standard.”	ACLU	v.	Miami-Dade	County	Sch.	Bd.,	557	F.3d	1177,	1200	(11th	Cir.), cert. 
denied, 130	S.	Ct.	659	(2009).	
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multiple	copies	of	the	children’s	book	Vamos a Cuba	after	some	parents	objected	to	
its	portrayal	of	work	and	school	life	in	Cuba	as	being	like	work	and	school	in	the	
United	States.	A	parent	and	two	organizations	challenged	the	removal	under	the	
First	and	Fourteenth	Amendments.	The	district	court	found	that	the	decisive	factor	
in	the	removal	of	the	book	was	the	school	board’s	intention	to	prevent	access	to	
ideas	with	which	it	disagreed	and	found	that	the	board’s	claim	of	inaccuracies	was	
a	pretext	 for	political	orthodoxy.	The	Eleventh	Circuit,	 in	 reviewing	 the	 facts	de 
novo,	held	that	prevention	of	access	to	factual	inaccuracies	was	the	motivation	for	
the	book’s	removal	and,	under	the	Pico	standard,	that	motivation	was	legitimate.	
Even	though	members	of	the	school	board	who	were	Cuban-American	may	have	
had	an	interest	in	the	book’s	removal,	the	court	of	appeals	found	that	their	interest	
did	not	impugn	their	motive.137	
Status of First Amendment Protection for Libraries’ Collection Decisions
Nonpublic forums given Broad discretion
¶63	The	Supreme	Court’s	American Library Ass’n decision	interrupted	the	lower	
courts’	line	of	precedent	applying	high	standards	of	scrutiny	to	libraries’	Internet	
and	collection	management	as	limited	public	forums	for	the	right	to	receive	infor-
mation.	 But	 some	 boundaries	 to	 libraries’	 discretion	 are	 implicit	 in	 American 
Library Ass’n and	 explicit	 in	 other	 library	 cases.	 One	 of	 the	 ambiguities	 of	 the	
American Library Ass’n plurality	opinion	is	whether	the	library’s	collection	repre-
sents	a	nonpublic	forum	or	whether	it	is	not	a	forum	at	all.138	If	library	collections	
are	nonpublic	 forums,	 courts	would	not	allow	content-based	distinctions	unless	
they	were	reasonable	in	light	of	the	library’s	purpose.	In	addition,	viewpoint	dis-
tinctions	would	not	be	permitted.	But,	if	library	collections	are	simply	not	forums	
at	all,	discretion	might	be	limited	only	at	the	point	that	it	becomes	invidious	view-
point	discrimination.	The	bottom	line	is,	publicly	funded	law	and	other	types	of	
libraries	 have	 either	 broad	 discretion	 to	manage	 their	 collections	 or	 very	 broad	
discretion	to	manage	their	collections.
	 137.	 Id. at	1227.
	 138.	 The	 plurality	 points	 to	 public	 broadcasters	 and	 federal	 arts	 awards	 as	 “two	 analogous	
contexts”	in	which	“the	government	has	broad	discretion	to	make	content-based	judgments	in	decid-
ing	what	private	 speech	 to	make	available	 to	 the	public.”	United	States	v.	Am.	Library	Ass’n (ALA 
II),	539	U.S.	194,	204	(2003)	(citing Ark.	Educ.	Television	Comm’n	v.	Forbes,	523	U.S.	666,	672–73	
(1998);	Nat’l	Endowment	for	the	Arts	v.	Finley,	524	U.S.	569	(1998)).	In	Forbes,	the	Court	outlined	
the	usual	public	forum	categories	and	included	a	fourth	category	for	properties	that	are	“not	fora	at	
all.”	Forbes,	523	U.S.	at	677.	Although	the	Forbes Court	found	the	candidate	debate	at	issue	was	a	non-
public	forum,	the	Court	suggested	that	most	other	television	programming	decisions	would	not	be	
held	to	even	the	low	standards	of	the	nonpublic	forum	because	the	editorial	decisions	of	broadcasters	
could	not	be	expected	to	be	viewpoint	neutral.	See id. at	679–82.	In	Finley,	the	Court	found	federal	
arts	 awards	 based	 on	 excellence	 necessarily	 were	 content-based	 decisions	 and	 absolute	 neutrality	
would	not	be	possible.	The	Court	characterized	the	awards	criteria	of	excellence	as	content-	but	not	
viewpoint-based	and	suggested	that	invidious	viewpoint	discrimination	might	present	constitutional	
problems.	See Finley,	524	U.S.	at	585–87.	
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Unreasonable content-Based distinctions Prohibited
¶64	The	American Library Ass’n decision	may	be	seen	as	holding	public	libraries	
to	 the	 nonpublic	 forum	 standards	 that	 require	 content-based	 distinctions	 to	 be	
reasonable	in	light	of	the	library’s	purpose.	The	Court’s	widely	shared	concern	that	
libraries	should	unblock	web	sites	to	allow	access	to	protected	speech	indicates	that	
libraries’	discretion	has	limits.	One	explanation	would	be	that	the	library	was	held	
to	the	 low	standards	for	nonpublic	 forums,	which	would	require	content	restric-
tions	 to	 be	 reasonable	 in	 light	 of	 the	 library’s	 purpose.139	 The	 district	 court	 in	
Crosby interpreted	the	American Library Ass’n	decision	in	this	way	when	it	upheld	
a	community	college	library’s	Internet	use	policy	as	reasonable.140
¶65	This	reasonableness	standard	might	allow	a	library	discretion	to	decide	to	
filter	the	Internet	in	an	attempt	to	prioritize	access	to	categories	of	content	most	
likely	to	support	its	collection	development	policy	as	a	way	to	manage	limited	com-
puter	and	bandwidth	resources.	Similarly,	a	court	might	uphold	as	reasonable	a	law	
library’s	removal	of	all	computer	manuals,	older	textbooks,	and	foreign	law	from	a	
jurisdiction	no	longer	taught	or	studied	by	the	faculty	in	order	regain	shelf	space	
for	newer	publications.	But,	if	an	academic	law	library	were	to	remove	all	books	on	
the	legal	history	of	slavery	or	filter	web	sites	about	women’s	health	but	not	men’s,	a	
court	might	well	find	the	decision	to	be	a	content-based	distinction	that	was	unrea-
sonable	 in	 light	of	 the	 library’s	purpose	and	therefore	 in	violation	of	speech	and	
press	freedoms	under	the	First	Amendment.	Particularly	if	the	content	restriction	
raised	equal	protection	questions	of	race	or	gender	discrimination,	a	court	might	
take	the	approach	of	Brown	v. Louisiana	and	determine	that	a	library	had	exceeded	
the	 boundaries	 of	 its	 First	 Amendment	 discretion.	 Law	 libraries	 are	 unlikely	 to	
violate	 the	 law,	 though,	 as	 they	 develop	 collections	 to	 meet	 the	 needs	 of	 their	
patrons.	
Viewpoint distinctions Versus content distinctions
¶66	 If	 library	 collections	 and	 Internet	 access	 are	 nonpublic	 forums,	 courts	
would	also	hold	libraries	to	standards	of	viewpoint	neutrality.	Libraries	would	be	
prohibited	from	making	collection	decisions	based	on	the	viewpoint	expressed	in	a	
book,	journal,	or	Internet	site.141	
	 139.	 See, e.g.,	 Int’l	 Soc’y	 for	 Krishna	 Consciousness,	 Inc.	 v.	 Lee,	 505	 U.S.	 672,	 678–79	 (1992)	
(outlining	qualities	of	 traditional	 and	dedicated	public	 forums	and	 then	characterizing	 the	 rest	by	
default	as	nonpublic	forums).	“Finally,	there	is	all	remaining	public	property.	Limitations	on	expres-
sive	 activity	 conducted	 on	 this	 last	 category	 of	 property	must	 survive	 only	 a	much	more	 limited	
review.	The	challenged	regulation	need	only	be	reasonable,	as	long	as	the	regulation	is	not	an	effort	to	
suppress	the	speaker’s	activity	due	to	disagreement	with	the	speaker’s	view.”	Id.
	 140.	 See Crosby v.	 S.	 Orange	 County	 Cmty.	 Coll.	 Dist.,	 172	 Cal.	 App.	 4th	 433	 (Cal.	 Ct.	 App.	
2009).
	 141.	 See, e.g.,	 Cornelius	 v.	 NAACP	 Legal	 Def.	 &	 Educ.	 Fund,	 Inc.,	 473	 U.S.	 788,	 806	 (1985)	
(“Although	a	speaker	may	be	excluded	from	a	nonpublic	forum	.	.	.	the	government	violates	the	First	
Amendment	when	it	denies	access	to	a	speaker	solely	to	suppress	the	point	of	view	he	espouses	on	an	
otherwise	includible	subject.”	(citations	omitted));	Perry Educ.	Ass’n	v.	Perry	Local	Educators’	Ass’n,	
460	U.S.	37,	48–49	(1983)	(“[T]he	school	mail	system	is	not	a	public	forum	.	.	.	.	[H]owever,	the	access	
policy	adopted	by	the	.	.	.	schools	favors	a	particular	viewpoint	.	.	.	and	consequently	must	be	strictly	
scrutinized	.	.	.	.”	(citation	omitted)).	
370 LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL Vol. 102:3  [2010-21]
¶67	The	complexity	of	the	collection	management	process	and	the	malleability	
of	 content	 and	 viewpoint	 categories,	 though,	 could	 make	 viewpoint	 neutrality	
review	difficult.	Viewpoint	distinctions	may	be	just	as	unavoidable	as	content	dis-
tinctions	 in	 a	 library’s	 collection	 management	 process.142	 Because	 content	 and	
viewpoint	are	not	clearly	differentiated,	some	distinctions	that	might	be	considered	
viewpoint-based	could	receive	more	deferential	treatment	if	a	court	defined	those	
distinctions	as	content-based.	For	example,	graphic	sexual	content	was	at	issue	in	
both	American Library Ass’n and	in	American Council of the Blind v. Boorstin.143	In	
American Library Ass’n,	the	Supreme	Court	treated	graphic	sexual	images	as	con-
tent,	 which	 courts	 allowed	 libraries	 broad	 discretion	 to	 exclude.144	 But	 in	 the	
Boorstin case,	the	district	court	treated	graphic	sexual	content	as	viewpoint,	which	
the	court	would	not	give	the	library	discretion	to	exclude.145	
¶68	Realistically,	courts	are	unlikely	to	interfere	with	law	libraries’	title-by-title	
collection	 decisions,	 even	 when	 they	 turn	 on	 distinctions	 between	 viewpoints.	
Courts	do	not	 like	 to	 review	complex	 library	 collection	decisions	 that	balance	a	
multiplicity	of	factors	such	as	quality	of	publisher,	scholarly	stature	of	the	author,	
relevance	to	local	practice	habits	or	curricular	needs,	cost,	currentness,	etc.	But	if	a	
law	 library	 were	 to	 collect	 only	 materials	 that	 advocated	 protection	 for	 school	
prayer	and	excluded	materials	that	argued	against	protection	for	school	prayer,	a	
court	could	find	the	library’s	practice	offensive	to	the	First	Amendment	using	non-
public	forum	standards	prohibiting	viewpoint	distinctions.
Viewpoint distinctions Versus Invidious Viewpoint discrimination 
¶69	Courts	might	hold	libraries	to	an	even	more	lenient	standard	that	prohibits	
only	viewpoint	distinctions	 that	are	“invidious	discrimination”	against	 the	view-
point.	Eugene	Volokh	has	suggested	that	quality-based	selective	subsidies	of	private	
speech	might	be	bound	by	this	standard.146	With	this	more	generous	extension	of	
judicial	deference,	publicly	 funded	libraries	might	be	permitted	to	make	distinc-
tions	based	on	viewpoint	but	could	not	discriminate	against a	viewpoint	due	 to	
hostility	toward	the	view	or	toward	those	who	hold	the	view.147	
	 142.	 “[I]t	 is	 hardly	 clear	 that	 the	 line	 between	 viewpoint	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 content	 dis-
crimination	can	be	sustained,	except	possibly	in	extreme	cases.	Many	subject	matter	restrictions	(or	
standards	of	quality)	will	mask	or	reflect	viewpoint	distinctions	.	.	.	.”	Schauer,	supra	note	50,	at	105	
(1998).	Schauer	has	suggested	that	librarians	might	appropriately	make	some	viewpoint	distinctions	
and	wrote	that	few	would	disagree	“with	the	ability	of	a	librarian	to	select	books	accepting	that	the	
Holocaust	happened	to	the	exclusion	of	books	denying	its	occurrence.”	Id. at	106.
	 143.	 United	 States	 v.	 Am.	 Library	 Ass’n (ALA II),	 539	 U.S.	 194,	 200–01	 (2003);	 Am.	 Council	
of	the	Blind	v.	Boorstin,	644	F.	Supp.	811	(D.D.C.	1986).
	 144.	 See	ALA II,	539	U.S.	at	208.
	 145.	 See Boorstin, 644	F.	Supp.	at	816.
	 146.	 eUgene voLokh, the first Amendment And reLAted stAtUtes: probLems, cAses And 
poLicy ArgUments	 411–12,	 429	 (3d	 ed.	 2008).	The	Finley Court	 does	not	 rest	 its	 holding	on	 this	
distinction	but	says,	“[W]e	have	no	occasion	here	to	address	an	as-applied	challenge	.	.	.	shown	to	be	
the	product	of	invidious	viewpoint	discrimination.	If	the	NEA	were	to	leverage	its	power	to	award	
subsidies	on	the	basis	of	subjective	criteria	into	a	penalty	on	disfavored	viewpoints,	then	we	would	
confront	a	different	case.”	Nat’l	Endowment	for	the	Arts	v.	Finley,	524	U.S.	569,	587	(1998).
	 147.	 Black’s Law Dictionary defines	 “invidious	 discrimination”	 as	 “[d]iscrimination	 that	 is	
offensive	or	objectionable,	esp.	because	it	involves	prejudice	or	stereotyping.”	bLAck’s LAw dictionAry 
535	(9th	ed.	2009).	The	Oxford English Dictionary	defines	“invidious”	as	“[e]ntailing	odium	or	ill-will	
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¶70	Justice	Souter’s	dissent	in	American Library Ass’n suggests	that	a	majority	of	
the	Court	would	agree	that	clear	evidence	of	a	library’s	viewpoint	discrimination	
would	offend	the	First	Amendment.	Justice	Souter	wrote	that	“in	extreme	cases”	the	
evidence	 will	 be	 available	 for	 judicial	 determination	 that	 a	 public	 library	 was	
excluding	material	 for	“impermissible	 reasons	 (reasons	 even	 the	 plurality	would	
consider	 to	 be	 illegitimate),	 like	 excluding	 books	 because	 their	 authors	 are	
Democrats	or	their	critiques	of	organized	Christianity	are	unsympathetic.”148	
¶71	The	Pico plurality’s	standard	for	reviewing	school	library	book	removal	is	
similar.	Intent	to	suppress	access	to	ideas	may	be	the	same	as	invidious	viewpoint	
discrimination.	The	Pico plurality	summarized:	“[W]e	hold	that	local	school	boards	
may	not	remove	books	from	school	library	shelves	simply	because	they	dislike	the	
ideas	contained	in	those	books	and	seek	by	their	removal	to	‘prescribe	what	shall	be	
orthodox	in	politics,	nationalism,	religion,	or	other	matters	of	opinion.’”149	Justice	
Blackmun,	in	concurring,	wrote	“officials	may	not	remove	books	for	the	purpose of	
restricting	 access	 to	 the	 political	 ideas	 or	 social	 perspectives	 discussed	 in	 them,	
when	 that	 action	 is	 motivated	 simply	 by	 the	 officials’	 disapproval	 of	 the	 ideas	
involved.”150	Blackmun	noted	widespread	support	for	this	limit	on	library	discre-
tion	among	the	plurality	and	the	dissent:	“[A]s	the	plurality	notes,	it	is	difficult	to	
see	 how	 a	 school	 board,	 consistent	 with	 the	 First	Amendment,	 could	 refuse	 for	
political	reasons	to	buy	books	written	by	Democrats	or	by	Negroes,	or	books	that	
are	‘anti-American’	 in	 the	broadest	 sense	of	 that	 term.	 Indeed,	 Justice	Rehnquist	
appears	‘cheerfully	 [to]	 concede’	 this	 point.”151	 The	 Eleventh	Circuit	 applied	 the	
Pico	standard	in	Miami-Dade but	upheld	the	school	book	removal,	finding	that	the	
impermissible	intent	was	not	the	sole	motivation.152	Miami-Dade shows	that	this	
low	standard	 for	 impermissibility	presents	difficult	 evidentiary	challenges.	When	
other	criteria	coexist	with	impermissible	motivation,	determination	of	what	is	pre-
text	and	what	is	motivation	is	elusive.153	
¶72	 The	 hypotheticals	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 article—a	 collection	 of	
Democratic	 but	 not	 Republican	 authors,	 rejection	 of	 donated	 books	 arguing	
against	voting	rights	for	women,	filtering	of	web	sites	on	women’s	breast	health,	and	
removal	of	 racist	publications—present	a	 range	of	potential	 invidious	viewpoint	
upon	the	person	performing,	discharging,	discussing,	etc.”	8	oxford engLish dictionAry 50 (2d	ed.	
1989).	Martin	Redish	describes	invidious	viewpoint	discrimination	as	that	which	targets	the	speaker	
because	 of	 hostility	 toward	 the	 speaker’s	 “pre-existing	 ideological	 and	 political	 expressive	 asso-
ciations.”	Martin	Redish,	Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of 
Viewpoint Discrimination, 41	Loy. L.A. L. rev.	67,	117	(2007).
	 148.	 ALA II,	 539	U.S. at	 236	 (Souter,	 J.,	 dissenting)	 (citing	Bd.	 of	 Educ.	 v.	 Pico	 (Pico III),	 457	
U.S.	853,	870–71	(1982)	(plurality	opinion)).
	 149.	 Pico III,	 457	 U.S.	 at	 872	 (quoting	 W.	 Va.	 Bd.	 of	 Educ.	 v.	 Barnette,	 319	 U.S.	 624,	 642	
(1943)).
	 150.	 Id.	at	879–80	(Blackmun,	J.,	concurring	in	part	and	concurring	in	the	judgment).	
	 151.	 Id. at	878.
	 152.	 ACLU	 v.	 Miami-Dade	 County	 Sch.	 Bd.,	 557	 F.3d	 1177,	 1207	 (11th	 Cir.), cert. denied,	
130	S.	Ct.	659	(2009).
	 153.	 Joelle	 C.	 Achtman,	 Note,	 Pico Takes a Visit to Cuba: Will Pretext Become Precedent in 
the Eleventh Circuit?, 63	U. miAmi L. rev.	943	(2009)	(reviewing	public	school	library	book	removal	
challenges).
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discrimination	 practices.	 A	 successful	 justification	 for	 the	 first,	 the	 systematic	
favoring	of	one	major	political	party	over	another,	would	be	difficult	to	imagine.	
As	discussed	above,	the	rejection	of	donated	books	on	a	topic	might	be	considered	
either	content	or	viewpoint	distinctions	and	might	be	justified	by	current	collec-
tion	coverage,	limited	shelf	space,	or	even	irrelevance	to	a	small	county	law	library’s	
collection	plan.	In	most	cases,	a	plaintiff	would	have	a	difficult	burden	to	prove	that	
a	 library	 rejected	 the	books	 solely	with	 the	 intent	 to	prevent	 access	 to	 the	 ideas	
expressed.	The	filtering	of	web	sites	with	the	term	“breast”	might	exclude	a	great	
deal	of	women’s	health	information,	but	even	a	law	library	with	the	broader	mis-
sion	to	support	a	law	school	might	be	able	to	justify	the	restriction	on	the	basis	of	
specific	health	information	not	being	relevant	to	the	law	school’s	curricular	priori-
ties.	The	removal	of	materials	because	they	express	a	racist	perspective	is	by	defini-
tion	a	removal	based	on	suppression	of	access	to	the	viewpoint,	so	a	library	might	
have	 a	 difficult	 time	 defending	 the	 action	 if	 challenged.154	 If	 the	 book	was	 not	
appropriate	for	other	reasons,	such	as	not	supporting	an	updated	collection	devel-
opment	policy	or	not	being	a	priority	when	shelf	space	is	tight,	the	coexistence	of	
intent	 to	 suppress	 access	 to	 the	 idea	 could	 survive	 a	Pico-type	 test.	Despite	 the	
invalidation	of	some	campus	hate	speech	codes	as	offensive	to	the	First	Amendment,	
some	campuses	still	have	such	codes,	so	law	school	libraries	might	encounter	con-
flict	between	campus	imperatives	and	the	First	Amendment.155
Procedural due Process for Internet Acceptable-Use Policies
¶73	When	libraries	create	Internet	use	policies	that	limit	patrons’	access	to	ille-
gal	or	low-priority	content	in	keeping	with	the	library’s	collection	policy	and	mis-
sion,	 the	American Library Ass’n decision	makes	clear	 that	 libraries	are	probably	
within	 their	discretion	under	 the	First	Amendment.	However,	when	patrons	 are	
found	in	violation	of	the	library’s	policies,	the	Miller	district	court	opinion	stands	
as	 an	 indication	 that	 the	 library	 may	 be	 held	 to	 some	 procedural	 due	 process	
requirements,	 such	 as	 an	 appeals	 process,	 before	 the	 patron	 is	 denied	 access	 to	
library	resources.156	The	Internet	itself	is	a	powerful	tool	and	sometimes	a	unique	
resource	for	legal	information,	so	policies	about	use	and	enforcement	of	those	poli-
cies	are	now	integral	to	law	libraries’	collection	management.	
first Amendment Rights of Libraries
¶74	The	library	plaintiffs	in	American Library Ass’n	argued	that	their	authority	
to	 make	 collection	 decisions	 should	 have	 First	 Amendment	 speech	 status	 and	
therefore	 be	 immune	 to	 the	 regulatory	 and	 even	 conditional	 funding	 efforts	 of	
Congress.	Justice	Stevens,	in	dissent,	embraced	this	argument	and	wrote	that	CIPA	
offends	the	First	Amendment	because	it	impairs	the	ability	of	local	libraries	to	truly	
	 154.	 “The	 U.S.	 approach	 to	 regulation	 of	 racist	 speech	 is	 one	 of	 broad	 protection,	 with	 the	
exception	of	situations	in	which	such	speech	is	coupled	with	violence.”	Jeannine	Bell,	Restraining the 
Heartless: Racist Speech and Minority Rights,	84	ind. L.J.	963	(2009);	see R.A.V.	v.	St.	Paul,	505	U.S.	377	
(1992).
	 155.	 See Bell,	 supra note	 154,	 at	 975	 (citing	 Doe	 v.	 Michigan,	 721	 F.	 Supp.	 852	 (E.D.	 Mich.	
1989)	and	UMW	Post	v.	Bd.	of	Regents	of	Univ.	of	Wis.,	774	F.	Supp.	1163	(E.D.	Wis.	1991)).	
	 156.	 See Miller	v.	Nw.	Region	Library	Bd., 348	F.	Supp.	2d	563	(M.D.N.C.	2004).
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employ	 their	 own	 discretion	 and	 acts	“as	 a	 blunt	 nationwide	 restraint	 on	 adult	
access	.	.	.	.”157	The	libraries’	claim	was	noted	by	the	plurality	as	an	argument	that	
ran	 counter	 to	 First	Amendment	 precedent,	 yet	 the	 plurality	 specifically	 left	 the	
issue	open.158	
¶75	Academic	freedom	could	be	recognized	as	a	basis	for	academic	law	libraries’	
First	Amendment	authority	to	manage	collections	without	institutional	or	external	
governmental	 interference.	 Currently,	 though,	 the	 law	 of	 academic	 freedom	 is	
underdeveloped,	and	the	application	of	any	such	protections	to	academic	librarians	
or	other	librarians	is	unclear.159
Conclusion
¶76	This	survey	of	the	First	Amendment	law	of	 library	collections	shows	that	
law	libraries	and	other	publicly	funded	libraries	have	broad	discretion	to	make	col-
lection	decisions,	including	decisions	about	Internet	access.	Good	collection	man-
agement	practices	will	 tend	to	conform	to	First	Amendment	 law,	since	 librarians	
are	likely	to	make	choices	that	are	reasonable	in	light	of	their	library’s	purpose,	and	
because	librarians	generally	uphold	the	library	profession’s	commitment	to	robust	
discourse	and	noncensorship.	Libraries	should	take	care	that	policies	on	access	to	
information	 though	 the	 library’s	 Internet	 support	 the	 library’s	 mission,	 and	 if	
restrictions	are	enforced,	the	library	should	follow	procedures	that	allow	patrons	an	
appeals	process	before	library	information	resources	are	denied.	
¶77	The	First	Amendment	could	provide	some	protection	to	librarians’	collec-
tion	decisions,	perhaps	shielding	them	from	authorities	lacking	librarians’	expertise	
and	commitment	to	ethical	principles	of	robust	access	to	information.	Currently,	
however,	libraries	and	librarians	do	not	have	this	type	of	First	Amendment	insula-
tion.	 But	 the	 boundaries	 of	 libraries’	 First	 Amendment	 discretion	 can	 protect	
librarians’	efforts	to	provide	access	to	information,	even	when	that	information	is	
controversial.	 If	 institutional	 interference	or	 external	 forces	 threaten	 to	 limit	 the	
collection	in	some	way,	librarians	can	take	refuge	not	only	in	library	professional	
ethics	and	the	logic	of	supporting	libraries’	missions,	but	also	in	the	boundaries	of	
discretion	under	the	First	Amendment.	Fortunately,	law	library	directors	generally	
report	 to	 judges,	 boards	 of	 local	 attorneys,	 or	 law	 school	 deans,	many	 of	 them	
experts	in	the	First	Amendment	and	generally	protective	of	librarians’	role	as	col-
lection	managers.	Even	so,	the	test	of	robust	access	to	information	is	tolerance	for	
unpopular	views,	so	law	librarians	should	be	alert	not	only	to	the	external	threats	
but	also	to	their	own	inclinations	to	shape	collections	to	reflect	their	own	interests	
	 157.	 United	 States	 v.	 Am.	 Library	 Ass’n (ALA II),	 539	 U.S.	 194,	 220	 (2003)	 (Stevens,	 J.,	
dissenting)	 (rejecting	 the	 constitutional	 conditions	doctrine’s	 recognition	of	 a	 distinction	between	
inducement	through	restrictions	on	benefits	and	outright	prohibitions).	
	 158.	 See id. at	211	(plurality	opinion).
	 159.	 See, e.g.,	 Judith	 Areen,	 Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First 
Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97	 geo. L.J.	 945	 (2009);	 Neal	 H.	
Hutchens,	 A Confused Concern of the First Amendment: The Uncertain Status of Constitutional 
Protection for Individual Academic Freedom, 36	J.c. & U.L.	145	(2009);	Frederick	Schauer,	Is There a 
Right to Academic Freedom?,	77	U. coLo. L. rev.	907	(2006).	
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or	 tolerances.	Law	 librarians	 are	 the	primary	 custodians	of	 libraries’	broad	First	
Amendment	 discretion	 and	 should	 exercise	 that	 discretion	 with	 awareness	 that	
collection	management	can	support	library	institutional	missions,	librarians’	ethi-
cal	principles,	and	a	number	of	the	important	goals	of	the	First	Amendment.		

